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"[The War on Terror] is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who
believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom."1
George W. Bush
I. INTRODUCTION
Be it the Middle Ages2 or the Renaissance,3 the Great War4 or the
Cold War,5 the trends of human history have always been characterized
by epochs or eras. While it is sometimes difficult to find the exact chron-
ological line separating one era from the next, some eras are born in a
single dramatic event of such enormity that the very date overshadows
the general theme of the times. As December 7, 1941,6 was to the World
War III era, so too was September 11, 2001,8 to the new era that many
believe has now arrived on the stage of history. Arguably, the post-Cold
1. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20,2001); see Cum-
mings, infra note 133.
2. The Middle Ages are also commonly known as the Dark Ages due to the total
collapse of the great Roman civilization. This period in human history extended from ap-
proximately the fall of Rome in 476 A.D., when the last Roman emperor, Romulus Augus-
tulus, was deposed by the barbarian tribes under the leadership of Odoacer the Goth, to
1350 A.D.
3. The Renaissance began in the middle of the 14"h century in Italy with a re-awak-
ened interest in all things Greek and Roman. It ended in Germany about 200 years latcr
with Martin Luther's successful challenge to the Roman Catholic Church which had domi-
nated European life and thought.
4. The Great War is also commonly known as World War I. It was the first modern
world war and said, at the time, to be the "war to end all wars." The Great War lasted
from 1914 until 1918 in which the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan,
and Belgium defeated Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria.
5. See WALTER LA FEBER, AMERICA, RUSSIA AND THE CoLD WAR: 1945-1996 (1996).
The Cold War lasted from 1945 until December 1991, with the collapse of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics into a number of independent republics. See generally id.
6. December 7, 1941, was the date of the infamous attack by Japan on the U.S. mili-
tary facilities at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This event directly triggered the U.S. involvement
in World War II. Several U.S. lawmakers equated the shock of the terror attack of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, to the surprise Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. See Miles A. Pomper,
In For the Long Haul, CONG. Q., Sept. 15, 2001, at 2118.
7. World War II lasted from 1939-1945 in which the United States, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union, and other allies defeated Germany, Japan, and Italy.
8. Erica Goode, A Day of Terror: The Psychology, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,2001, at A13
[hereinafter Day of Terror]. On September 11, 2001, a total of nineteen members of the
terrorist al-Qa'eda network hijacked four domestic U.S. passenger aircraft while in flight
(five terrorists in three of the planes and four in the fourth). The terrorists crashed two of
the aircraft into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York. The terrorists
crashed another plane into the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., but passengers forced down
the fourth plane into a field in Pennsylvania. According to a New York Tites tally, along
with billions of dollars in property loss, approximately 3,067 were killed, not including the
19 terrorists. See Dead and Missing, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2002, at A12. This figure in-
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War9 era may have indeed given way to a new period labeled by most
commentators as the "War on Terror.""0
The purpose of this monograph is to survey the dominant characteris-
tics of the War on Terror and to briefly highlight some of the legal and
policy implications that confront the United States. Ultimately, even if
one is cynical enough to believe that the world politic is ruled primarily
by the application or threat of force,' it is nevertheless of critical impor-
tance from both a national and an international perspective that the
United States rubricate its leadership role by thoughtful concerns for the
positive advancement of the rule of law. 2 The world's most precious
commodities-the promotion of democratic values13 and human
rights' 4 -must not become causalities of the War on Terror.
cludes 184 dead at the Pentagon (counting the 59 passengers on the hijacked plane) and 40
dead in Pennsylvania. See id.
9. The so-called post-Cold War era began in 1991. It was referred to as the post-Cold
War era because no clear new world theme had emerged.
10. See eg., Katharine Q. Seelye & Elisabeth Bumiller, After the Attacks: The Presi-
dent; Bush Labels Aerial Terrorist Attacks "Acts of War,' N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13,2001, at A16.
President Bush first used the phrase "war on terror" on September 11, 2001, aboard Air
Force One. His first major public address the next day also declared the terrorist attacks as
"acts of war." See id. Other synonyms include the "War on Terrorism" and the "War on
Global Terrorism." See also General Franks Says War Will Be Long, USA TODAY, Mar.
29,2002, at 15A. In regards to the war on terror, Army General Tommy Franks remarked:
"The problem is going to last longer than my life span and the life spans of a lot of people
... " Id. General Franks is in command of the U.S. Central Command.
11. For an excellent discussion of realist theory of international relations, see Joseph
Nye, The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians, EcoNoMssr, Mar. 23, 2002, at 23. Nye
writes: "But the new conventional wisdom that America is invincible is equally dangerous
if it leads to a foreign policy that combines unilateralism, arrogance, and parochilism."
Nye, supra.
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (7th ed. 1999). Black's defines the rule of law as
"a substantive legal principle. The doctrine that every person is subject to the ordinary law
within the jurisdiction." See id. The rule of law in international law is found in both treaty
obligations and in "customary international law." Customary international law comes
from observing past uniformities among nations of a norm or standard that has reached
widespread acceptance in the international community. Evidence of customary interna-
tional law may be found in judicial decisions, the writing of noted jurists, diplomatic corre-
spondence, and other evidence concerning the practice of States.
13. The term "fundamental freedoms" generally refers to all of those basic rights asso-
ciated with democratic forms of governments and encapsulated in the U.S. Bill of Rights.
See eg., COMM'N ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE U.S. CONSrrrION. THE CONsTrurtON
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE § Forward (1991).
14. The term "human rights" is commonly meant to include so-called first and second-
generation human rights. Through treaty and customary international law, first generation
human rights are binding on all nation-states. See REs'rATEa.NT (TiiiRD) OF Timn FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987). The Customary International
Law of Human Rights lists these first generation human rights as: (1) genocide, (2) slavery
or slave trade, (3) the murder, or causing the disappearance of, individuals, (4) torture or
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE WAR ON TERROR
"The goal of terror is to kill one and frighten 10,000. "1s
Chinese proverb
A. What Is Terrorism?
Although many trace the etymology of the word "terror" to France's
Reign of Terror under Robespierre and the Jacobians, 16 the employment
of terror is a phenomenon that has been around for a very long time in
human history.17 Interestingly, however, there exists no global consensus
on a precise definition of "terrorism."18 This was due in part to the ten-
sions of the Cold War era where West and East could agree on precious
little,'9 but also continues today under the clich6 that "one man's terrorist
is another man's freedom fighter. '20 For instance, suicide bombers2" in
other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, (5) prolonged arbitrary de-
tention, (6) systematic racial discrimination, and (7) a consistent pattern of committing
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. See id. Second generation
human rights are legally binding only on those nation-states that have obligated themselves
through treaty. Second generation human rights speak to political and civil freedoms such
as the freedom of religion, peaceful assembly, privacy, association, fair and public trial,
open participation in government, movement, etc. Second generation human rights are the
functional equivalents of democratic values found in the U.S. Constitution. See generally
FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN Ricn-srs (1991).
15. See SUN-Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 224 (Ralph D. Sawyer trans., 1994).
16. The lawyer Maximilien Robespierre is most often identified as the chief figure
during the Reign of Terror, where the revolutionary leaders of the State engaged in the
indiscriminate execution of thousands by the guillotine. The height of the Reign of Terror
occurred from 1793-1794. Paradoxically, Robespierre was a victim of the guillotine in
1794.
17. See, e.g., THE COMPLETE WORKS OF FLAVIUs JOSEPHUS (William Whiston trans.,
1981). The Hebrew Zealots conducted random acts of assassination against the occupying
Romans in Judea prior to the fall of Jerusalem by the Roman legions under Titus in 70
A.D. See id.
18. See USA Patriot Act, infra note 169, § 411.
19. For an excellent discussion of the politics of the Cold War, see LA FEnER, supra
note 5.
20. See, e.g., JOHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (1990) [herein-
after NATIONAL SECURITY LAW]. Chapter 10 of the text provides an overview of the his-
torical development of terrorism and discusses the proposition that "the causes of
terrorism or the political motivation of the individual terrorists are relevant to the problem
of definition." Id. at 443. Under this proposition, many have argued that acts of violence
against "colonialism" or in wars of "national liberation" fall outside of the definition of
terrorism. See id. Hence, the dilemma of "[o]ne man's terrorism is another man's hero-
ism." Id.
21. For example, The Minneapolis-St. Paid Star Tribune prefers not to use the word
"terrorist" when reporting on Palistinian suicide bombers because each side calls the other
terrorists. See Lou Gelfand, Newspaper Careful in Use of Label 'Terrorist,' STAR TRiu.
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Israel who intentionally kill innocent Jewish civilians may be considered
"heroes" by certain segments of the Palestinian people and terrorists by
others. 2
Recognizing the politics associated with reaching an acceptable global
definition for terrorism, the United Nations (U.N.) has elected to avoid
the term terrorism altogether,23 to use it in a general sense only, 4 or to
carefully carve out very specific acts in selected international treaties to
characterize as terrorism.' Perhaps the greatest missed opportunity for
the U.N. to establish a firm international definition of teirorism as it re-
lates to States that sponsor or support terrorists26 occurred in its failure to
use the word terrorism in the context of the key 1957 U.N. General As-
sembly resolution defining "aggression ' 2 7 (as it relates to Article 2 1s and
(Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Feb. 3,2002, at 27A; Bob von Sternberg, Group Wants Star
Tribune to Change Policy on 'Terrorist,' STAR TRm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Apr. 3,
2002, at 06A.
22. See eg., James Bennet, Israelis Declare Arab Ioman Was in Fact a Suicide
Bomber, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2002, at A6. The Israelis have suffered scores of suicide
attacks by Palestinian terrorists in the last year. This particular suicide attack was the first
such attack against Israel carried out by a female. See Margot Dudkevitch, Use of Woman
Suicide Bomber Changes Security Requirements, JERusA.Nit Posr, Jan. 28, 2002, at 03.
23. There have been several Draft proposals over the years by various U.N. Commis-
sions and Sub-Commissions regarding the definition of terrorism. See, e.g., 1954 Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 9,
at 11-12, U.N. Doc A12693 (1954). The International Law Commission's 1954 Draft Code
of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind contained the following proposed
language at Article 25: "IT]he undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State
of terrorist activity in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of organ-
ized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State .... " Id. Unfortu-
nately, as of this writing, the U.N. General Assembly has not been able to reach agreement
on a final version. In addition, the latest attempt by the U.N. Sub-Commission on Human
Rights to come up with a definition of terrorism has met similar troubles. The first draft
report of February 2001 listed three essential elements of terrorism. See id. A terrorist act:
(1) must be illegal, violating national or international law; (2) must be intended to harm
the State for political reasons; and (3) must be capable of generating a state of fear in the
general population. See id. However, in order to reach consensus on its first progress
report, the special rapporteur deleted the entire definition. See U.N. Doe. EICN.4/Sub.2/
2001/31.
24. See U.N. Sec. Council Res. 1368 (Sept. 12,2001) [hereinafter SC Res. 13681. The
U.N. Security Council resolution uses the word terror or terrorism six times in the short
one page document. See id. Like all other U.N. efforts in this area, 1368 uses the term
terrorism but offers no definition of terrorism other than to affirm that the September 11,
2001, attack on the U.S. was "horrifying terrorist attack[s]." Id.
25. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
26. See CHAsEY, infra note 46 and accompanying text.
27. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, at 142,
U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1957) [hereinafter U.N. Definition ofAggression]. The U.N. Definition
of Aggression states in main part:
Article 1
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Article 5129 of the U.N. Charter). The U.N. chose to classify the activities
of States who send, organize, or support "armed bands, groups, irregu-
lars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against a
State... ,30 as engaging in unlawful aggression in direct violation of the
U.N. Charter and not as terrorism.
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, or political independence of another State, or in any manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations ....
Article 2
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall consti-
tute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression ....
Article 3
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall... qualify as an
act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State ... of another State or
part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another
State... ;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another
State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea, or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State ... in contravention of the conditions
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such terri-
tory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal
of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggres-
sion against a third State; or,
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State, of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein.
Id.
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
Id.
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take
at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.
Id.
30. U.N. Definition of Aggression, supra note 27, at (g).
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In the United States, the difficulties in definition do not relate to a
reluctance to use the term terrorism,31 but rest in the sheer number of
different government instrumentalities that have offered independent in-
terpretations which, while similar, are not identical.32 The latest Ameri-
can effort to define terrorism is found at section 411 of the USA Patriot
Act, signed into law in November of 2001.33 Actually, the USA Patriot
Act provides definitions for "terrorist organization," "domestic terror-
ism," and "international terrorism. '34 A terrorist organization is defined
as one that is:
(1) designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization
under the process established under current law; (2) designated by
the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization for immigration pur-
poses; or (3) a group of two or more individuals that commits terror-
31. See Jim Meenan, Clinton: Terrorists Misjudged America, S. BEND TRIB., Oct. 12,
2001, at Al. Former President Bill Clinton touched on this issue in a speech in the Mendel
Center at Lake Michigan College and also reminded the audience that the United States
government had engaged in terrorism against slaves and American Indians. See W. Per-
haps the most infamous example of an American solider employing terror against women
and children in the context of war was union general William T. Sherman in his march
across the deep South in 1864-1865. Sherman's war crimes were in violation of numerous
articles of war contained in the Lieber Code, adopted by the U.S. in 1863 as General Order
100. See generally RicHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND TUE LAW OF NVAR
(1983) [hereinafter LIEBER CODE]; MARSHA LANDRETM, WILLiM T. SHERLMAN (1990).
32. There are numerous federal statutes that offer slightly different definitions of ter-
rorism. See, eg., 28 C.F.R. § 85 where the Department of Justice defines terrorism as "the
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives." 18 U.S.C. § 2331 offers a slightly different definition of international
terrorism:
(1) the term "international terrorism" means activities that-
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any
State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination
or kidnapping, and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are ac-
complished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the
locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum;
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2000), anended by Pub. L No. 107-56, Title VIII, § 802(a), 115 Stat. 376
(Oct. 26, 2001).
33. See USA Patriot Act, infra note 169.
34. Id.
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ist activities or plans or prepares to commit (including locating
targets for) terrorist activities.""5
Domestic terrorism is defined in the Act as the "unlawful use, or
threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individuals based [in
the United States] ... committed against persons or property to intimi-
date or coerce a government, [or] the civilian population... in further-
ance of political or social objectives."36 International terrorism is also set
out in the Act as follows:
International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to
human life that violate the criminal laws of the United States or any
state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or any state. These acts appear in-
tended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the
policy of a government by intimidation to coercion, or affect the con-
duct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International
terrorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national
boundaries in terms of how terrorists accomplish them, the persons
they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the place in which
the perpetrators operate.37
Despite the lack of a fixed universal agreement defining terrorism, the
essential goal of terrorism is readily identifiable. As the root word im-
plies, the goal of terrorism is to instill fear in a given civilian population
by means of violence. In the oft-repeated Chinese proverb, the objective
of the terrorist is to kill one and frighten 10,000.38 While specific acts of
terrorism may appear to be mindless and irrational, terrorism is the an-
tithesis of confused behavior. Terrorism is a goal-directed, calculated,
and premeditated use of force.
Since the victims of terrorism are invariably innocent civilians, 39 it ap-
pears fundamentally logical that a definitional approach should concen-
trate on the act and not the political, religious, or social causes which
motivate the act. Under this regime, the use of violence on a civilian
target with intent to cause fear in a given civilian population is easily
35. Id.
36. Id. § 802.
37. Id.
38. See SUN-TZU, supra note 15, at 224.
39. "Civilians" are defined in the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Relative to
the Protections of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S,
No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The central purpose of the rules is to protect innocent civilians
in times of armed conflict. See id.
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classified as a terrorist act In other words, to the common understand-
ing of the general public, terrorism is immediately associated with vio-
lence that is directed at the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians to
create a climate of fear.4' In this light, bombings of public places, the
sending of letter bombs or poisons through the mails," hijackings of air-
craft, hostage taking, etc., are all acts of terrorism regardless of the under-
lying cause said to justify the attack. In a sense, terrorism can simply be
described as making "war" on civilians. 43
This war on civilians can be committed by individuals, 4 sub-State
groups,45 or by States. States who engage in terrorism are further divided
as either State-sponsors or State-supporters of terrorism. A State is con-
sidered to be a State-sponsor of terrorism when it uses its own resources
to secretly commit acts of terror against another State.46 When a State
openly provides aid and support to a terrorist organization, it is said to be
a State-supporter of terrorism. Of course, in terms of culpability under
40. But see Joshua Hammer, Another Lebanon, NEWswEEk, Mar. 4,2002, at 28. Some
Palestinian militants urge that only Israeli soldiers should be targeted in the current con-
flict as they are "legitimate" targets. See id.
41. See H. I-L COOPER, EVALUATING THE TERRORIST THREAT, PRiNcicL.s oF Ap.
PLIED RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (Int'l Assoc. of Police Chiefs, Clandestine Tactics & Tech. Se-
ries, 1974). Terrorism can be defined as "a purposeful human activity primarily directed
toward the creation of a general climate of fear designed to influence, in ways destined by
protagonists, other human beings, and through them some course of events." i.
42. See eg., Jennifer Barrett, The Year of Living Dangerously, NEwswr-EK, Jan. 8,
2002, at 10; David Noonan, Danger: Handle with Care, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 2001, at 38.
From September to November 2001, five U.S. citizens were killed by ingesting the Anthrax
virus sent through the U.S. postal system. See Kathy E. Nokes, Tracking the War on Ter-
rorism Sept. 11 Attacks, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 13,2001, at A14.
43. CALEB CARR, THE LEssONS OF TERROR: A HiSToRY OF WARFARE AGAINST Ci.
VILIANS, WHY IT HAS ALWAYS FAILED AND WHY IT WILL FAIL AGAIN (2002).
44. See generally Lou MICHEL & DAN HERBECK, AMERICAN TERRoRsr. TIMOTHY
McVEIGH AND Tim TRAGEDY AT OKLAHOMA Crrv (2001). Timothy McVeigh's 1995
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, is an example of
individual terrorism (Terry Nicholas, an accomplice, was also convicted). The bomb killed
167 people.
45. A sub-State terrorist group is defined as a group of individuals operating within a
State but without the knowledge of the State. The Japanese Aur Shinri Kyo religious
group was referred to as a sub-State terrorist group following their use of a lethal nerve
agent in a 1995 attack in a Tokyo subway. See, e.g., ROBERT JAY LiFroN, DESTROYING
THE WORLD TO SAVE IT AUM, SHINRIKYO, APOCALYPTIC VIOLENCE, AND THE NEW
GLOBAL TERRORISM (2000). Twelve people died and over 3,000 were injured. See i.
46. See eg., WILLIAM C. CHAsEY, THE LocKERIE COVERUP (1995). Libya commit-
ted a State-sponsored act of terrorism when it secretly employed Libyan government
agents to bomb an American-frequented discotheque in then West Berlin, West Germany,
in 1986. See id. Libya also committed a second State-sponsored act of terror with the in-
flight bombing of Pan Am Flight 800 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1989 which killed 278
persons. See id.
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international law, there really exists little difference between a State that
sponsors terrorists and a State that supports terrorists. Both situations
are equally illegal under the rule of law.47 While it is subject to legal
debate whether a particular terrorist act committed apart from the sup-
port or sponsorship of a State would be considered an "act of war,, 48 a
terrorist attack with the support or sponsorship of a State could very well
be deemed an act of war under international law.49
B. The War on Terror
The so-called War on Terror began for the United States on September
11, 2001, with coordinated suicide attacks via hijacked domestic airplanes
by nineteen members of a sophisticated "para-military" terrorist network
known as al-Qa'eda5 ° The simultaneous attacks occurred in New York,
Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania, killing over 3,000 people and de-
stroying billions of dollars in property.5 1
The al-Qa'eda is an umbrella organization founded in 1989 by a Saudi
Arabian named Osama (or Usama) bin Laden. Osama bin Laden formed
the group out of elements of the Maktab al-Khidamat, which was founded
by Osama bin Laden and Abdallah Azzam (a member of the Palestinian
Moslem Brotherhood5") in the early 1980s to provide money, equipment,
and manpower to the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union occupa-
tion of Afghanistan. With the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989, bin
Laden started al-Qa'eda in order to redirect his efforts to "attack the ene-
mies of Islam all over the world."53
From the early 1990s until the end of 2001, the al-Qa'eda operated
openly in the country of Afghanistan with the complete support of the
Pashtun-dominated Taliban government.5 4 During the tenure of the
Taliban regime, the relationship between the Taliban and the al-Qa'eda
terrorist organization provided a seminal example of State-supported ter-
47. U.N. Definition of Aggression, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
48. See Ruth Wedgewood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 599 (1999). Wedgewood advocates that terrorism may need to be incor-
porated into a new legal view of what qualifies as warfare. See id.
49. Id.
50. See ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, STRATEGIC STUDIES INST., rRANSNA IONAL
THREATS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST-. CRYING WOLF OR CRYING HAVOC? 91-92 (1999)
[hereinafter CRYING WOLF OR CRYING HAVOC].
51. Day of Terror, supra note 8
52. See infra note 110.
53. CRYING WOLF OR CRYING HAVOC, supra note 50, at 92.
54. See, e.g., Christopher Dickey, Training for Terror, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at
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rorism.55 In fact, under the Taliban, Afghanistan became a training
ground for thousands of Arab and non-Arab al-Qa'eda militants includ-
ing Kashmiris, Chechens, Uzbeks, Uighurs, and others.56 These training
camps sent cells of well-trained terrorists into numerous countries where
they were encouraged to recruit additional members and carry out terror-
ist attacks.57
C. An Act of War
In a speech delivered in 1984, then United States ambassador to the
U.N., Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, spoke of a coming "terrorist war [against the
United States], [that] is part of a total war which sees the whole society as
an enemy, and all members of a society as appropriate objects for violent
actions."58 Her words came to pass on September 11, 2001, and the world
community came to understand terrorism as an act of war. Indeed, view-
ing terrorism as an act of war is a new manifestation of the changing
nature of armed conflict. As such, it poses not only new challenges for
the historically fixed international rules relating to armed conflict,59 but it
also demands the development of new legal regimes which can effectively
address the threat of global terrorism.'
Apart from the enormity of the al-Qa'eda attack, what made the events
of September 11, 2001, so vastly different from all previous incidents of
terror 6 was that the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) both characterized the terror attack as an "armed attack"
on the United States. The unprecedented armed attack determination
was significant because it, in turn, immediately signaled that the United
States intended to frame the terror attack as an event equivalent to an act
55. But see Ali A. Jalali, Afghanistan: The Anatomy of an Ongoing Conflict, PAAME-
TERs, Spring 2001, at 89. Some commentators have argued that the Taliban regime was not
a recognized government. See id. Only three nations officially recognized the Taliban as
the legitimate government of Afghanistan - Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran. Jalali writes:
"Neither the Taliban-led 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan' nor the 'Islamic State of Af-
ghanistan' headed by ousted President Rabbani has the political legitimacy or administra-
tive efficiency of a State." Id.
56. See CRYING WOLF OR CRYING HAVOC, supra note 50. At least one American was
trained in an al-Qa'eda camp in Afghanistan and joined the Taliban forces. United States
citizen John Walker is now on trial in a federal district court in Virginia for crimes associ-
ated with his involvement with the terror network.
57. IL
58. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Speech at the Jonathan Institute's Conference on Interna-
tional Terrorism, Washington, D.C. (June 25, 1984).
59. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
60. See ifra notes 134-148 and accompanying text.
61. See National Security Institute, Terrorist Profiles, at http'/lnsi.org/Library/Terror-
ism/profterr.txt (last visited Mar. 31, 2002). The lethality of terrorism has only increased
over the years with the United States as the most frequent target of terrorism.
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of war62 under international law. Accordingly, several events soon fol-
lowed: a "use of force" Joint Resolution was passed by the United States
Congress;63 the President labeled the attack an act of war;(4 and, for the
first time in its history, NATO invoked its collective self-defense clause,
should a NATO member suffer an "armed attack."65 Thus, the War on
Terror is legally couched by the United States in terms of traditional law
of war terminology,66 even though a non-State actor carried out the ac-
tual attack.67
Understanding the need for international approval in prosecuting the
War on Terror under the rule of law, the United States turned to the U.N.
Security Council68 on the day after the attack in hopes of obtaining a
strong use of force resolution.69 Instead, the United States received what
might be deemed as a very strong statement of support by means of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1368.70 Nevertheless, because of the struc-
tured magnitude of the terrorist attack, Resolution 1368 specifically rec-
ognized America's "inherent right of individual and collective self-
62. The use of the term "war" or "act of war" traditionally refers to the use of aggres-
sive force against a sovereign State by another State in violation of the U.N. Charter and
customary international law. Such acts most often occur without a formal declaration of
war. See George Petrochilos, The Relevance of the Concepts of War and Armed Conflict to
the Law of Neutrality, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 575, 575 (1998).
63. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, infra note 76 and
accompanying text.
64. See infra note 10.
65. See North Atlantic Treaty, infra note 79 and accompanying text.
66. The term "law of war" is also known as the "law of armed conflict" or "interna-
tional humanitarian law." The law of war terminology will be used in this monograph. The
law of war is based on customary principles and treaty law, e.g., the Geneva Conventions,
and applies whether or not a State declares war per its domestic processes.
67. The distinction of whether an event qualifies as an act of war is more important in
terms of civil law. See Pan American World Airlines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). The Court found that the hijacking of an aircraft by a non-State
actor did not qualify as an "act of war" for the purpose of activating an exclusionary clause
in the insurance policy. See id.
68. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1; U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. Article 24 of the
U.N. Charter gives the Security Council the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1. Article 27 of the U.N.
Charter requires that all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council must agree on
enforcement provisions, i.e., the use of armed force. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. The
permanent members listed at Article 23 of the U.N. Charter are the Republic of China,
France, the Soviet Union [Russia now holds the seat], the United States, and Britain. U.N.
CHARTER art. 23, para. 1
69. See Gordon, infra note 91. The U.S. was seeking a resolution similar in tone to
U.N. Security Resolution 678 which allowed all members to push Iraq out of Kuwait during
the Persian Gulf War "by all means necessary." Id.
70. SC Res. 1368, supra note 24.
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defense in accordance with the Charter"1 and specifically called on "all
States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, or-
ganizers, and sponsors of these terrorist attacks."'  Resolution 1368 fur-
ther addressed the issue of responsibility for those States who supported
or sponsored the terrorist attacks by "stresses[ing] that those responsible
for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and
sponsors of these acts will be held accountable."'  Taken as a whole, it
can be argued that Resolution 1368 provided the United States and its
allies with the legal authority necessary to respond to the terrorist attack
through the appropriate use of military force in self-defense should a
State who supported, sponsored, or harbored the terrorists refuse to co-
operate in bringing those responsible to justice.
The United States Congress was also quick to address the attack. Al-
though Congress elected not to "declare war"7 4 under Article I of the
Constitution,75 they did issue a joint resolution which left no doubt as to
their desire to authorize the President to use military force if necessary. 76
The joint resolution is cited as the "Authorization for Use of Military
Force., 77 This resolution was passed by every member of the Senate and
every member of the House of Representatives, save one. Among other
things, the Congressional Resolution recognized the authority of the
President:
under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of
international terrorism against the United States... [,] [and] author-
ized [the President] to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons. 78
71. See U.N. CHARmER art. 51, supra note 29.
72. See SC Res. 1368, supra note 24 (emphasis added).
73. Id.
74. Certain statutory consequences attach to a Congressionally declared war. For ex-
ample, 50 U.S.C. § 21 provides that "[w]henever there is a declared war... all natives,
citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government... shall be liable to be
apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies." 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000).
75. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
76. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Public Law 107.40,
115 Stat. 224.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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NATO, of which the United States is a member, invoked its collective
self-defense clause under Article 5 of its Charter where "an armed attack
on one or more of [its members] shall be considered an attack on all,"
and that the members may exercise the right of self-defense which in-
cludes the "use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area."7 9 The real significance of invoking Article 5, how-
ever, rests more in the international recognition that the terrorist attack
was, indeed, tantamount to an armed attack or act of war.8"
Armed with the Congressional Joint Resolution, U.N. Resolution 1368
and the NATO Resolution, the President exercised his constitutional au-
thority as the Commander in Chief8 and quickly set about gathering the
necessary evidence to find those who committed the terrorist attacks and
to establish linkage to the State or States that may have provided support
to the terrorists.82 A conclusive body of evidence pointed directly to the
al-Qa'eda terrorist organization as the perpetrators of the attack and to
Afghanistan's Taliban as the State-supporter of the terrorist al-Qa'eda or-
ganization.13 Determined to respond, if necessary, under the inherent
79. North Atlantic Treaty, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. 1964 (1949). Article 5 of the Treaty
reads:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an armed attack against them all; and conse-
quently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of
the right of individual and collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Char-
ter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forth-
with, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as is deemed
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area.
Id.
80. See, e.g., William Drozdiak, Attack on U.S. is an Attack on All, NATO Agrees,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 13, 2002, at A25.
81. U.S. CONT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
82. See U.N. Definition of Aggression, supra note 27.
83. See Bin Laden Video, infra note 93; Neil King, Jr., Bush Tough Talk Shakes Up
Diplomatic Stance, WALL STREEr J., Jan. 31, 2002, at A20. Any reasonable doubts as to
the involvement of Osama bin Laden's terrorist group in the attacks of September 11,
2001, were dispelled by the December 14, 2001, public release of the "bin Laden video-
tape." The tape establishes that bin Laden: (1) knew when the hijackers would strike; (2)
knew that the hijackers understood that they were on a "martyrdom operation," but had
no details until shortly before the attacks; (3) was pleasantly surprised by the total collapse
of the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York; (4) listened with anticipation to
radio broadcasts to confirm the terror attacks; and (5) expressed joy and amusement as he
detailed the story of the attacks. See Bin Laden Video, infra note 93. Perhaps the most
convincing segment of the thirty-nine minute tape occurred when bin Laden stated to an
unidentified Shaykh: "We calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy,
who would be killed based on the position of the tower. We calculated that the floors that
would be hit would be three or four floors. I was the most optimistic of them all. Due to
my experience in this field, I was thinking that the fire from the gas in the plane would melt
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right of self-defense as codified in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 4 the
Bush Administration offered the Taliban government a time-certain ulti-
matum to turn over the al-Qa'eda leaders and to shut down all terrorist
camps in Afghanistan. 5 When the Taliban leadership refused to comply
with the demand, the United States exercised s in conjunction with
NATO and its other allies,8 the lawful use of military force to accomplish
those aims.ss
the iron structure of the building and collapse the area where the plane hit and all the
floors above it only. This is all that we had hoped for." Id.
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 51, supra note 29.
85. Bush Issues Ultimatun to the Taliban, Calls Upon Nation and World to Unite and
Destroy Terrorism, CONG. Q., Sept. 22,2001, at 2226. President Bush issued the ultimatum
in a speech given to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001. Bush, supra note 1.
The pertinent part reads: "And tonight, the United States of America makes the following
demands on the Taliban: Deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of al-
Qa'eda who hide in your land... [.1 [c]lose immediately and permanently every terrorist
training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their
support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist
training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not
open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They .vill
hand over the terrorists, or they will suffer their fate." Id.
86. There is a long history of U.S. Presidents utilizing military forces abroad in situa-
tions of military conflict or potential conflict to protect United States citizens or promote
United States interests. The number of instances where the President has used military
forces abroad in such situations without a Congressional declaration of War well exceeds
250 in number. Selected instances include: 1798-1800 - Undeclared Naval War with France;
1801-1805 - The Frst Barbary War (Tripoli declared war but not the U.S.); 1806 - Mexico
Incursion; 1806-1810 - Gulf of Mexico Incursion; 1810 - Vest Florida Incursion; 1812 -
Amelia Island in Florida; 1813 - West Florida; 1813-1814 - Marquesas Islands; 1814-1825 -
Caribbean (engagements between pirates and U.S. war ships in response to over 3,000
pirate attacks on merchantmen between 1815-1823); 1815 - Second Barbary Var;, 1950-
1953 - Korean War;, 1958 - Lebanon; 1962 - Cuba; 1962 -Thailand; 1964 - Congo; 1964-1973
- Vietnam War;, 1965 - Dominican Republic; 1980 - Iran; 1981 - El Salvador;, 1982 - Leba-
non; 1983 - Honduras; 1983 - Chad; 1983 - Grenada; 1986 - Libya; 1989 - Panama; 1989 -
Andean Region; 1991 - Persian Gulf War, 1993 - Bosnia; 1993-1995 - Somalia; 1993-1995 -
Haiti; 1997 - Serbia, etc.
87. Numerous nations contributed assistance to the U.S. led effort, including Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Britain, Russia, Germany, Australia, Canada, Japan, etc. In addition, much
of the actual ground combat was borne by indigenous Afghan tribal fighters, primarily the
so-called Northern Alliance under the guidance and support of U.S. Army Special Forces
and other U.S. Special Operations Forces conducting direct action and unconventional
warfare missions. For an excellent overview of the roles and missions of the Army's elite
Special Forces, see HANs HALBERSTADT, GREEN BERES, UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIORS
(1988).
88. See supra note 66. The employment of military force in an international armed
conflict must also comply with the law of war. From a targeting perspective this means:
(1) the target must be deemed a military objective-military necessity, (2) the use of force
must be proportional - proportionality, and (3) suffering must be reduced as practica-
ble-unnecessary suffering.
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In tandem with the removal of the Taliban regime from power, the
United States and its allies were able to destroy many of the al-Qa'eda
camps and dismantle much of the infrastructure of the terrorist group in
Afghanistan by the end of December 2001.89 By any account, the Bush
strategy90 of using American air power, American Special Forces and the
ground forces of various Afghan resistance groups worked well in terms
of mitigating the loss of life to American forces91 and reducing civilian
suffering.92 Since the fall of the Taliban government, the al-Qa'eda no
longer operates with the open support of a State, but has been forced to
revert to clandestine operations primarily as a sub-State terror group. 93
As of April 2002, States throughout the world had arrested well over
1,300 members of the al-Qa'eda network on a variety of terror-related
charges.94
89. See, e.g., James Risen, A Nation Challenged: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden Aide Reported
Killed by U.S. Bombs, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 2001, at Al. The military campaign to dis-
lodge the Taliban and al-Qa'eda from open control of Afghanistan took approximately
three months, from October 7 to December 23, 2001. Approximately 6,500 air combat
missions were flown which attacked over 120 fixed targets. Four hundred vehicles were
destroyed, and an undetermined number of enemy combatants were killed (some have put
the figure as high as 10,000). "In the first detailed assessment of the air war in Afghani-
stan, military officials say about 75 percent of the bombs and missiles used hit their targets
and probably destroyed or disabled them ... ." Eric Schmitt, A Nation Challenged: The
Bombing; Improved U.S. Accuracy Claimed in Afghan Air War, N.Y. TImEs, Apr. 9, 2002,
at A16.
90. See, e.g., Dan Balz, Bush Confronts a Nightmare Scenario: Crisis Looms as Refitt-
ing Test of President's Leadership, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2002, at A2.
91. See Michael R. Gordon, A Nation Challenged: The Debate; Gauging the Use of
Ground Troops and the Scale of the Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at A3. Early
critics of the Bush approach incorrectly predicted that the United States could not achieve
victory without the use of massive American ground forces and an attendant heavy loss of
life. This same pessimism was seen in exaggerated predictions of American lives that
would be lost in the Persian Gulf War should the U.S. attempt to expel Iraq from Kuwait in
accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
92. But see Barry Bearak et al., Unknown Toll in the Fog of War: Civilian Deaths in
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2002, at Al. The article discusses the issue of collateral
damage to civilians and civilian property caused by the U.S. air strikes. See id. The aver-
age estimate ranges between 1,000 to 1,300 civilian deaths. See also Jonathan Weisman,
Rumsfeld Admits Allies Were Killed, Feb. 22, 2002, USA TODAY, at A4.
93. See James M. Dorsey, Some Fear Bin Laden Video Will Strain Relations Between
U.S. and Saudi Arabia, WALL STREET J., Dec. 17, 2001, at A13 [hereinafter Bin Laden
Video].
94. See, e.g., David S. Cloud, Despite Numerous Arrest, CIA Chief Says al-Qa'eda
Group Is Still a Big Threat to U.S., WALL STREET J., Feb. 7,2002, at A12; WALL STREET J.
EUR., Mar. 20, 2002, at Al.
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Il. EXPANDING THE WAR ON TERROR
"The United States of America will not permit tile world's most dan-
gerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive
weapons. " 9 5
George W. Bush
With the establishment of an interim Afghan government under the
leadership of Hamid Karzai, the United States led coalition continues to
track down the remnants of the al-Qa'eda and Taliban now in hidingf.6
More importantly, from a foreign policy stance, the United States is
clearly attempting to parlay the resounding success it achieved in remov-
ing the renegade Taliban government from power into a deterrence signal
to other States who either support or sponsor terrorism. In his state of
the union message of January 29, 2002, President Bush cautioned the
American people that even though Afghanistan was no longer a sup-
porter of terrorist organizations, the War on Terror was not over. 7 Presi-
dent Bush also specifically labeled Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as "an
axis of evil,"98 due to their continuing support and sponsorship of terror-
ist groups.99 Beyond these three States, the yearly United States State
Department official list of nations considered as either States who sup-
port or sponsor terrorism currently includes Libya, Syria, Sudan, and
Cuba (North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are also on this list)."° In this con-
text, the President's key point in the address to the nation signaled his
resolve that the "United States of America will not permit the world's
95. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Jan. 29, 2002; see also
Sanger, infra note 97.
96. A member of the al-Qa'eda core leadership killed as of May 2002 includes Mo-
hammed Atef. See Obituary of Mohammed Atef Terrorist Thought to Have Planned Al-
Qa'eda's Attacks on the World Trade Centre and US Embassies in Africa, DAILY TEnu.
GRAPH (London), Nov. 19, 2001, at P23. The number two ranking official of al.Qa'eda,
Aby Zubaydah, was turned over to United States authorities on April 1, 2002. See Kevin
Johnson & Jonathan Weisman, Al-Qaeda Figure a 'Huge' Catch, USA TODAY, Apr. 2,
2002, at Al.
97. See David E. Sanger, Bush, Focusing on Terrorism, Says Secure US. Is Top Prior-
ity, N.Y. Tims, Jan. 30, 2002, at Al.
98. Id.
99. The term "axis" is commonly associated with the alliance between Japan, Ger-
many, and Italy in World War I. In the case of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea there is no
similar treaty alliance, only a shared willingness to support or sponsor international
terrorism.
100. For a list of known terrorist organizations and terrorist States published by the
U.S. State Department, see National Security Institute, supra note 61.
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most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive
weapons."' 0 '
President Bush's remarks raised much debate - both as a policy matter
and as a legal matter. Considering that the use of armed force can only
be justified under international law when used in self-defense, 0 2 can the
United States go beyond the rhetoric and actually carry the War on Ter-
ror to those rogue nations who are identified so closely as supporters and
sponsors of terrorist activities, but have not actually physically engaged in
an act of aggression against the United States? 0 3 Furthermore, even if
the United States has legal justification to employ its military force
against, for example, Iraq, there are practical matters which must be care-
fully weighed. 104 At a minimum, the United States must demonstrate
from the particular circumstances that the use of armed force in self-de-
fense will not create an even greater danger to international peace and
security.10 5
The question of whether the War on Terror should be expanded in-
volves two disturbing trends which pose a direct challenge to the peace
and stability of the world and stand at odds with the central goals of the
U.N. Charter to "maintain international peace and security"' 0 6 and to
"promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and for fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or relig-
ion.' 1 7 The first aspect relates to the radical ideological beliefs of the
new breed of terrorists and the totalitarian States which harbor them.
The second aspect relates to the willingness of these new-styled terrorists
to use weapons of mass destruction'08 in their desire to carry out grandi-
ose schemes to kill multitudes of civilians. Taken together, the mix is
101. Bush Issues Ultimatum to the Taliban, Calls Upon Nation and World to Unite and
Destroy Terrorism, supra note 85.
102. U.N. CHARTER art. 51, supra note 29.
103. See U.N. Definition ofAggression, supra note 27. The use of armed force against
a State who continues to openly harbor the remnants of the al-Qa'eda would pose little
legal argument.
104. Such practical matters include the moral and proportionality factors set forth in
the Catholic "just war" tradition. See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Living with
Faith and Hope After September 11, Pub. L. No. 5-491 (Dec. 2001).
105. See NATiONAL SECuRiTY LAW, supra note 20.
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
108. According to section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 1997, a weapon of mass destruction is defined as: "Any weapon or device that is
intended, or has the capability to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant num-
ber of people through the release of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors, a
disease organism, or radiation or radioactivity." National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997 § 1403, Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2422 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2302).
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lethal and a clear and present danger to the international peace and se-
curity of the global community.
First, the ideological motivations of many al-Qa'eda-styled terrorist or-
ganizations appear to be focused on the advancement of cult-like "relig-
ious" objectives rather than the more typical aspirations of traditional
old-styled terrorist groups who are primarily concerned with the achieve-
ment of political or territorial goals.'0 9 Driven by extremist Islamic apoc-
alyptic visions, these new groups are bent on destroying through violence
those individuals and things which are deemed to be outside of a very
narrow weltanschauung (world view).1" 0 Interestingly, a 1995 RAND-St.
Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism study revealed that "25
of 58, or 42 percent of known, active, international terrorists groups had a
predominately religious component or motivation,""' most often associ-
ated with radical Islamic fundamentalism.
Perhaps the most chilling revelation of this vicious mindset is found in
the so-called "bin Laden videotape,"" 2 released to the public on Decem-
ber 13, 2001. The tape clearly illustrates the religious machinations of the
al-Qa'eda terrorists and others who use religion to justify the mass mur-
der of innocent civilians." 3 In fact, in the case of many of the militant
Islamic terrorist organizations, direct links have been established to vari-
109. But see CRYING WOLF OR CRYING HAVOC, supra note 50, at 11-12. Cordesman
stresses that all religions have their extremists, but believes that Islam itself is a powerful
stabilizing force in most of the Middle East. See id.
110. Id at 83-94. There are numerous al-Qa'eda.styled terrorist organizations that fit
this mold: Abu Nidal Organization, a.k.a. Fatah Revolutionary Council; Armed Islamic
Group; al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya; Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas); Hezbollah, a.k.a.
Party of God, Islamic Jihad; International Islamic Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders;
Jamaat ul-Fuqra; al-Jihad, a.k.a. Islamic Jihad; The Palestine Islamic Jihad; Abu Sayyaf; al
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; etc. See CRYING WOLF OR CRYING HAVOC, supra note 50; National
Security Institute, supra note 61.
111. IAN 0. LEsSER ET AL, RAND, COUNTERING THE Nc-w TERRORISMt 17 (1999).
The RAND database includes all terrorist incidents since 1968. See id.
112. See Bin Laden Video, supra note 93.
113. Id. In the conversation between bin Laden and an unidentified Shaykh regarding
the attacks of September 11, 2001, numerous references are made to "Allah," "Muham-
mad," the "fiqu [holy war] of Muhammad," etc. At one point bin Laden boasts the attacks
were beneficial to a "true" understanding of Islam. "[The attacks] made people think
(about true Islam), which benefited them greatly." The tape closes with the guest praising
bin Laden in the name of Allah, "By Allah my Shaykh [bin Laden]. We congratulate you
for the great work. Thank Allah." Id.
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ous Deobandi religious schools or "madrassas," 4 which openly advocate
the most violent forms of terrorism against Western interests.' 5
Osama bin Laden and his followers are not simply another isolated
sub-State religious terror cult like Japan's Aum Shinriko.116 According to
a thought provoking special report from Newsweek entitled, "Why Do
They Hate Us," these groups "come out of a culture that reinforces their
hostility, distrust and hatred of the West - and of America in particu-
lar.""' 7 Like all enemies of freedom and pluralism, be it the German
Nazis or the Stalinist Communists, the Islamic terrorists attack the West
for what it is, not for what it has done." 8 In a nutshell, whether the anti-
Americanism is motivated by religious enmity, 19 radical idiosyncrasies,
or just blind hatred, these al-Qa'eda-styled terrorist groups have clearly
demonstrated that they have no regard or respect for human life let alone
the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others.120
Related to the inherent dangerousness of al-Qa'eda-styled terrorist
groups, is the fact that States which provide safe harbor or support to
these people suffer from the scourge of totalitarianism.121 'his is an im-
114. But see, e.g., Alan Zarembo, A Merger of Mosque and State, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15,
2001, at 28. Sheik Muhammad Raffaat Othman who teaches Islamic law at Cairo's Al-
Azhar University believes the Koran prohibits "attacking innocent, unarmed people." Id.
The "Prophet Muhammad demanded that we not kill women, children or the elderly. At-
tacks should be against soldiers and armed civilians." Id.
115. Rick Bragg, A Nation Challenged: Schools; Shaping Young Islamic Hearts and
Hatreds, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 2001, at Al.
116. See LiFrON, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
117. Fareed Zakaria, Why Do They Hate Us?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22,2001, at 24. How-
ever, Zakaria makes the point in the same article that "[e]very Islamic country in the world
has condemned the attacks of Sept. 11 [except for Iraq]. To many, bin Laden belongs to a
long line of extremists who have invoked religion to justify mass murder and spur men to
suicide." Id.
118. Id. The al-Qa'eda has cited numerous grievances against the U.S. which justifies
their use of terror to include puppet Arab governments, importation of oil, support for
Israel, Westerners living in Arab lands, morally corrupt Western culture, etc. See id.
119. See Andrea Stone, In Poll, Islamic World Says Arabs Not Involved in 9/11, USA
TODAY, Feb. 27, 2002, at Al. A Gallup poll indicates that a majority of the Arab world
condemned the attack on the U.S., but believes that Arabs did not carry it out. See id.
This opinion is shared despite the fact that all nineteen of the hijackers were Arabs. See
CRYING WOLF OR CRYING HAVOC, supra note 50, at 91-92.
120. See Bin Laden Video, supra note 93.
121. For an excellent umbrella definition of a totalitarian regime, see NAIONAL S.
CURrrY LAW, supra note 20, at 77. Professor John Norton Moore, University of Virginia
School of Law, writes:
A radical totalitarian regime ... seems to blend together a mixture of a failing cen-
trally planned economy, severe limitations on economic freedom, a one party political
system, an absence of an independent judiciary, a police state with minimal human
rights and political freedoms at home, denials of the right to immigrate, heavy involve-
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portant phenomenon because terror groups could probably not flourish
into sophisticated networks without the overt support of a State.
Democracies do not sponsor or support terrorism, dictatorships do.
There exists an abundance of empirical evidence that democracies do not
engage in international terrorism, instigate war, engage in democide (ge-
nocide and mass murder),"2 or abuse the human rights of their people."m
As Anthony Lake, a former Clinton Administration Special Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, related in an address at John
Hopkins University: "Democracies tend not to wage war on each other
and they tend not to support terrorism - in fact, they don't. They are
more trustworthy in diplomacy and they do a better job of respecting
the... human rights of their people."124 Certainly, in the preamble to
the U.N. Charter' 25 and in Article 1 of the Charter,126 it is evident that
the framers also understood nations who respect human rights and funda-
mental freedoms do not support or engage in terrorism.
Second, the world must wake out of its millenary sleep and recognize
the real possibility that weapons of mass destruction will be used against
ment of the military in leadership, a large percentage of GNP devoted to the military
sector, a high percentage of the population in the military, leaders strongly motivated
by an ideology of true beliefs including willingness to use force, aggressively anti-West-
erm and antidemocratic in behavior, and selective support for wars of national libera-
tion, terrorism, and disinformation against Western or democratic interests.
Id.
122. See, eg., R. J. RUMMiEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMEN. GENOCIDE AND MASS MUR-
DER IN TH TwENTim- CENTURY (1994) [hereinafter DEATn ny GovEN.%ir-mxr]. Rum-
mel's exhaustive statistical research is considered to be the groundbreaking work in this
area and points the way to a new paradigm on war avoidance. In short, if democracies do
not fight each other, then it is in the interest of the global community to promote the
spread of democratic behavior.
123. One of the most disturbing aspects of the Taliban was their systematic abuse of
women. See Tun McGirk & Shomali Plain, Lifting the Veil on Ser Slavery, Tst , Feb. 18,
2002, at 8. "Of all the ways the Taliban abused women, this [systematic rape and slavery]
may be the worst." Id.
124. Anthony Lake, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
Address at Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (Oct. 21,
1993).
125. U.N. CHARTER preamble:
[T]o reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,
and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising
from treaties and.., to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom AND FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace
with one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain interna-
tional peace and security ....
Id.
126. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
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large civilian population centers. Clearly, the terror attacks of September
11, 2001, have demonstrated that international terrorism has now
"brought us across the threshold" of creating mass casualties. The al-
Qa'eda-styled terrorist is not content to kill in the tens or twenties; he
aggressively seeks access to weapons of mass destruction in order to mur-
der in the thousands and tens of thousands. While nuclear weapons may
be beyond the reach of international terrorists at this time, 27 biological
and chemical weapons are not. Biological and chemical agents are inex-
pensive, easy to obtain, hard to trace and capable of killing thousands.
Add into the equation the fact that al-Qa'eda terrorists have evidenced
a clear desire to use weapons of mass destruction, 128 and a doomsday
scenario becomes a central consideration of whether or not the War on
Terror should be expanded. 129 Even one or two dedicated suicide bomb-
ers armed with a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon could inflict cat-
astrophic death and destruction in an urban environment."' 0
The problem, of course, is how does one deal with an ideology steeped
in pseudo-religious fanaticism which compels its foot soldiers of terror to
gladly commit suicide in order to kill innocent civilians?'31 If it seems
obvious that third party dispute mechanisms will bear no fruit with ter-
rorists who are filled with such hate and contempt of the democratic
ethos; one is left with the unpleasant truism voiced by the ancient Ro-
mans - "oderint dum metuatant" (let them hate us as long as they respect
us).
1 3 2
127. See Peter Eisler et al., U.S. Cities Brace for the Next Acts of Terrorism, USA
TODAY, Sept. 24, 2001, at 5A [hereinafter Next Acts of Terrorism].
128. See, e.g., Public Agenda, Special Report: Terrorism, at http://
www.publicagenda.org/specials/terrorism/terror.htm (last modified Mar. 13, 2002). There
are four general scenarios regarding the terrorist use of nuclear devices: the terrorist
makes a crude nuclear bomb using smuggled uranium or fissile material; an unstable nation
falls into the hands of terrorists (e.g., Pakistan is said to have dozens of nuclear weapons); a
conventional bomb is employed to explode radioactive materials (so-called "dirty bomb");
or a nuclear power plant is attacked. See id.
129. Andrew Quinn, Loss of Nuclear Material Tabulated, SAN JOSE MERCURY Nuws,
Mar. 7,2002, at Al. Researchers at Stanford University have complied a "database of lost,
stolen and misplaced nuclear material - depicting a world awash in weapons grade ura-
nium and plutonium that is not publicly accounted for." Id.
130. See Next Acts of Terrorism, supra note 127.
131. For an excellent overview of this issue, see Zakaria, supra note 117, at 21.
132. See generally ARTHUR FERRILL, THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (1986); MAR-
GARET LYrTELTON & WERNER FORMAN, THE ROMANS (1985). But see CARR, supra note
43. Carr argues that as long as Rome exercised its military power in a way that did not
terrorize civilians it was highly successful. See CARR, supra note 43. The Roman practice
of offering Roman citizenship to tribes who agreed to serve in the Roman Army as auxil-
iary troops greatly benefited the expansion of the Empire. For example, the Honariani
Atecotti Seniores were formed from captured pirates from the Scottish Atecotti tribe circa
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In the short term, the United States was not able to reason with the al-
Qa'eda and the Taliban to comply with the principles of peace embodied
in the U.N. Charter. Fortunately, America was able to employ the proper
application of force under the rule of law, as President Bush pledged in
his first major speech following the September 11, 2001, attack, to "bring
them to justice or bring justice to them."' 33
A more troubling question for the United States and the entire civi-
lized world is how to prevent future attacks by sophisticated State-sup-
ported or State-sponsored terrorist groups, particularly in light of their
use of weapons of mass destruction. If the employment of a weapon of
mass destruction is on the near horizon, do the international rules related
to the use of force, i.e., only used in self-defense, actually work in the real
world? In other words, must a State wait for a catastrophic State-spon-
sored or State-supported terrorist attack before it can respond,'34 or does
a threatened State have the right to engage in anticipatory self-de-
fense,135 or even, perhaps, in a controversial legal theory known as
"counterproliferation self-help?"' 6
300 A.D. and served in the Auxilium Palatinum (the author is a descendant of this tribe).
On the other hand, the later Roman practice of slaughtering civilians only stiffened resis-
tance amongst the barbarians who eventually conquered Rome.
133. See, eg., Jeanne Cummings, Bush Says Our Nation Saw Evil, but Isn't Frightened
into Chaos, WALL STREET J., Sept. 12, 2001, at A6.
134. The concept of self-defense is not created by the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art.
51 simply recognizes the "inherent right of self-defense." U.N. CHARTER art. 51, supra
note 29. In the U.S., the customary right of a State to use military force in self-defense is
traced to the famous Caroline Doctrine formulated by Secretary of State Daniel Webster
in response to an 1837 raid by Canadian troops into New York. See William McHugh,
Forcible Self-help in International Law, 25 NAVAL VAR C. REv. 61 (1972). Under the
Caroline Doctrine a State may resort to necessary and proportional acts of self-defense if
such acts arise out of an instant and overwhelming necessity, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment of deliberation. See id.
135. See MYERs S. McDOUGAL & FLoRmrrNO P. FEUCIANO, LAw AND M,%IU,%I
WoRLD PuBLIc ORDER (1961). The concept of anticipatory self-defense is viewed in the
context of an "imminent" armed attack and is viewed as a part of the "inherent" right of
self-defense of Article 51 of the Charter. For an opposing view, see Josef L Kunz, Individ-
ual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 Ats. J.
INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947). Regardless, the use of force in self-defense must be reasonably
proportionate to the specific danger that is to be averted. See GEmArD Vox GLAHN,
LAW AMONG NATIONS (6th ed. 1992).
136. See eg., Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal
Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destrtc-
tion, 27 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 483,485 (1999) [hereinafter Counterproliferation Self-
Help].
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The concept of anticipatory self-defense is also termed alternatively as
"preventative self-defense" '137 or "first strike," and has been used by the
Israelis against another State, as illustrated by Israel' air strike on Arab
airfields in the 1967 War and against individuals, as illustrated in the Pal-
estinian conflict.1" The United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul
Wolfolwitz, is a leading proponent of anticipatory self-defense and has
not only spoken with approval of the Israeli military's use of preemptive
force in regards to the killing of known Palestinian terrorists,1 39 but has
embraced the idea as a necessary instrument of United States policy in
the War on Terror: "Our approach has been to aim at prevention and not
merely punishment. We are at war. Self-defense requires prevention and
sometimes preemption.' 1
40
The idea of counterproliferation self-help is focused on dealing with
rogue totalitarian States that seek to acquire weapons of mass destruc-
tion. The concept argues that when a totalitarian State or terrorist group
using a weapon of mass destruction directly threatens the national sur-
vival of another State, a new international legal regime should allow for
the threatened State to engage in the "preventive or preemptive use of
force to either deter acquisition plans, eliminate acquisition programs, or
destroy illicit weapons of mass destruction sites at any stage in the
proliferator's acquisition efforts,"' 4 ' The 1981 Israeli air attack on Iraq's
Osiraq nuclear reactor is the best illustration of this emerging doctrine,
although it has also been cited as an instance of anticipatory self-
defense.' 42
Clearly, the argument that the War on Terror must be enlarged because
of the overwhelming danger posed to the global community is not an im-
possible position to advance in the era of weapons of mass destruction.
Nevertheless, if respect for the rule of law is to survive as the measure of
civilized behavior, it does not contribute to the discussion to advocate the
use of armed force apart from those long established parameters. The
137. For an excellent discussion of the issues, see NATIONAL SECURrrY LAW, supra
note 20.
138. The Israelis have long used the concept of first strike to target known terrorists
fighters before they commit future acts of terrorism.
139. See Steven Erlanger, A Nation Challenged: Diplomacy; Russian Aide Warns U.S.
Not to Extend War to Iraq, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 4, 2002, at A10.
140. Id.
141. Counterproliferation Self-Help, supra note 136. Roberts argues that the Israeli
strike on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor could be classified as an example of this new para-
digm in practice. See id.
142. See Louis Rene Beres & Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's Destruc-
tion of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 437 (1995); W. Thomas
Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi
Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 75 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417 (1982).
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United States must abide by the international principles as they now exist
and defeat global terrorism within the framework of the rule of law.
While it is certainly prudent to sternly warn States that by supporting or
sponsoring terrorism they will be held absolutely accountable for any acts
of aggression; anticipatory self-defense can only be used if the United
States can demonstrate a significant terrorist attack is truly imminent'43
and satisfy an appropriate response criterion based on the following four
factors:
" the gravity of the threat-what type of support is being provided by
the totalitarian regime to the terrorist group?;
* an analysis of past practices, mutates mutandis (in other contexts),
i.e., what is the track record of the subject totalitarian regime vis a
vis terrorism?;
" have all other means of action to deter the aggressive conduct been
exhausted?; and
* what will be the real and political repercussions of the use of armed
force?
Thus, even if the attack of September 11, 2001, is to be considered an
act of war by the al-Qa'eda and the Taliban, the United States cannot
unilaterally expand the War on Terror to nations not directly linked to the
September 11, 2001, assault. This would be beyond the scope of Resolu-
tion 1368. Again, unless the United States obtains concrete evidence that
a significant State-sponsored or State-supported terrorist attack is immi-
nent, it is both prudent and necessary for the United States to follow the
pattern it has set for itself since the end of the Cold War and seek specific
U.N. Security Council approval for future uses of armed force in self-
defense.144
What United States policy makers can and must do is develop an active
global-based strategy designed to deter and defeat future al-Qa'eda-
styled terror attacks. At a minimum, this means three things. First, the
U.N. must be energized to immediately address the issue of reaching con-
sensus on a definition for terrorism, which should also include language
regarding when a particular act of terrorism should be considered as an
act of war. 45 Second, the United States must insist the concept of
counterproliferation self-help be placed on the table as a viable addition
143. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
144. During the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. sought and obtained specific U.N. Secur-
ity Council authority for the use of military force. U.N. Security Council Resolution 678
(Nov., 29 1990). Resolution 678 reads in part: "The Security Council ... 2. Authorizes
member States cooperating with the government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before Janu-
ary 15, 1991, fully implements ... the foregoing Resolutions, to use all necessary means
to... restore peace and security in the area .... ." Id.
145. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
2002]
THE SCHOLAR
to the international rule of law regarding the use of force against a State
that sponsors or supports terrorists or engages in aggression.146 In this
regard, the United States will do well to obtain the direct assistance and
input of the major powers, 147 particularly the Russians.14 8
Third, juxtaposed to pressing the international community for concrete
definitions and new legal approaches on how to fight terrorism in the new
era, the United States should also earnestly promote the spread of demo-
cratic values as the absolute best avenue to promote war and terrorism
avoidance.' 49 Democracy is not an American value; democracy is a nor-
mative world value. The world community has wisely given assistance to
the new Afghan government to build roads, schools, factories, homes,
etc., contingent on its movement towards the adoption of democratic val-
ues, yet even more must be done in this region of the world.150 In the
long view, the totalitarian ponds that foster terrorism must be drained.
Finally, whatever the future may hold, the United States must continue
to reinforce the basic truism that a democracy never answers terror with
terror in the context of the employment of military force in self-defense.
The United States is absolutely obligated under international law to fol-
low the law of war as codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and as
set out in custom.151 By all accounts, the American military did an out-
standing job in the combat activities in Afghanistan in abiding by the law
of armed conflict while caring for basic humanitarian needs of civilians
146. See Counterproliferation Self-Help, supra note 136 and accompanying text.
147. Joseph Nye, dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, argues that
"America must mobilise [sic] international coalitions to address shared threats and chal-
lenges." Nye, supra note 11, at 25.
148. Karen Elliott House & Andrew Higgins, Putan Warns Bush Against Going It
Alone When it Comes to Iraq, WALL STRrT J., Feb. 11, 2002, at Al.
149. See DEATH BY GOVERNMENT, supra note 122.
150. Carlotta Gall & Mark Landler, A Nation Challenged: Rebuilding; Afghans Plan-
ning Army in Place of 'Rule of Gun,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at All.
151. See Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Lessons of My Lai, 31 REVUE Ds DROIT MILrrAIRV
ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE [The Military Law and Law of War Review] 73 (1992). Apart
from the legal requirement to follow the law of war there are at least five practical reasons
that the rules should be followed. First, the law of war rests on an ancient foundation of
intrinsically accepted humanitarian concerns. Second, the issue of reciprocity dictates that
we should follow the rules if we want the opposing side in the conflict to do likewise.
Third, abuses of the law of war do not shorten the conflict or facilitate the restoration of
peaceful relations. Abuses merely sow the seeds of hatred in the next generation. Fourth,
the use of military assets to engage in attacks on civilians is a waste of those resources.
Fifth, civilized nations will not provide the necessary homefront support to a war that is
waged in violation of the law of war or civilized behavior.
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caught up in the conflict.'5 2 As the world's leading democracy, it is im-
perative that the United States continue to exercise the lawful use of mili-
tary force in accordance with the letter and spirit of the rule of law or face
the possibility that it will be battling the children of terrorism in the next
generation.15
3
IV. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE WAR ON TERROR
"The boisterous sea of liberty is never without a wave."154
Thomas Jefferson
The probability that terrorist organizations like al-Qa'eda may employ
chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons of mass destruction in suicide
attacks poses not only a direct threat to the well-being of tens of
thousands of innocent people, but raises new controversies regarding the
possible curtailment of long-recognized civil liberties.155 On the one
hand, the United States government must have the necessary tools to
protect the most basic rights of its citizens who suffer as the victims of
terrorism. While on the other hand, when creating greater security from
future terrorist attacks, the United States government must not trample
on American liberties in the name of preserving them. Without question,
the looming challenges of severe international and domestic terrorism
pose significant and acute dilemmas for democratic policymakers. Cur-
rently, six main areas of concern have emerged as the government devel-
ops new approaches to deal with future terrorist threats. They involve:
(1) the use of military tribunals; (2) the power of the United States to
investigate, detain, and question terrorist suspects; (3) the expansion of
the use of the United States military to enforce domestic law; (4) immi-
gration; (5) the use of new information-gathering technologies; and (6)
the increase in security measures at airports and other public facilities.
A. Brief Overview of Past Efforts to Address Terrorism
As the world watched helplessly while hijacked planes smashed into
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the attack exposed gaping vul-
nerabilities in both United States military and law enforcement strategies
152. See Patrick E. Tyler, A Nation Challenged: The Aide, N.Y. Tte, Sept. 28,2001,
at B2. In conjunction vith the military campaign, the U.S. airdropped tons of food to
Afghan civilians.
153. See, eg., Jeffrey F. Addicott, U.S. Must Follow the Law of War or Battle Enemy's
Children, BIRMINGHAM NEvs, Oct. 28, 2001, at CS.
154. ROBERT ANDREWS, THE COLUMBIA BOOK OF QuoTA'n Ns 517 (1993).
155. The term "civil liberties" generally refers to "freedom from undue governmental
interference or restraint" as measured against the protections of the Constitution. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (7th ed. 1999).
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to guard the nation against a full-fledged international terrorist attack.
Although the threat of a significant terrorist attack on United States soil
was not an unknown topic of discussion prior to the events of September
11, 2001,156 the federal government did very little in the area of antiter-
rorism. 5 7 In part, it might be said that actions to address the threat of
organized terrorism were piecemeal and misguided"5 8 because the United
States had no frame of reference in which to gauge the magnitude of the
threat.159
In the international sphere, a brief survey of the United States' ap-
proach to global terrorism prior to September 11, 2001, reveals America
was content to enter into a handful of specific international conventions
aimed at encouraging multi-lateral cooperation in punishing certain nar-
rowly defined acts of terrorism, such as hostage taking and hijacking of
aircraft. 6 ° The United States' position' 6 ' was simply a mirror of the
156. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, At Least 5 Die, 500 Hurt as Explosion Rips Garage
Under WTC, WASH. PosT, Feb. 27,1993, at Al. The February 26, 1993, terrorist attack on
the World Trade Center in New York prompted much discussion on the topic, but no ac-
tion beyond the prosecution of those directly responsible. The terrorists exploded a home-
made bomb in a parking garage of the World Trade Center. See id.
157. Antiterrorism refers to proactive steps taken to decrease the probability of a
terrorist incident, e.g., increased security screening measures at airports, concrete barriers
used to block traffic from public buildings, etc.
158. See, e.g., Brian McGrory & Michael Kranish, Clinton Aides Regret Letting bin-
Laden Off, HoUSTON CHRON., Sept. 23,2001, at 7A. After the dual bombings of two U.S.
embassies in Africa left more than 300 people dead in the summer of 1998, then President
Clinton vowed that "[n]o matter how long it takes, or where it takes us, we will pursue
terrorists until the cases are solved and justice is done." Id. Militarily, President Clinton
launched 75 cruise missiles at some al-Qa'eda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a
suspected VX nerve gas production facility at the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant in Khartoum,
Sudan. See id. Nancy Soderberg, a former National Security Council senior aide in the
Clinton administration admitted: "In hindsight, it wasn't enough, and anyone involved in
policy would have to admit that." Id.
159. See MICHEL & HERBECK, supra note 44. The closest analogy was the domestic
terror bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995.
160. Some examples of specific antiterrorist conventions include: The Convention on
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention),
T.I.A.S. No. 159 (1963); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Hague Convention), 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (1971); Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention),
T.I.A.S. 7570 (1973); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention),
T.I.A.S. 8532 (1976-77); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hos-
tages Convention), 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 39, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/34/39 (1979).
161. See Terrorism at Home and Abroad: Applicable Federal and State Laws, CRS
Report 95-1050 (updated Sept. 24, 2001).
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world community's ineffective approach to the problem of global terror-
ism.162 Washington seemed content to react to incidents. 6 3
In the domestic arena, apart from various criminal reforms making ter-
rorist acts abroad a crime under United States domestic law,"6 most of
the attention of the Executive Branch and Congress was focused on pass-
ing various domestic counterterrorism 65 legislation. This legislation was
limited in scope and designed primarily to assist in planning and training
efforts for the use of emergency personnel responding to a major terrorist
incident involving a weapon of mass destruction. 1" Early on, these ini-
tiatives received much deserved criticism as a band-aid approach to the
real-world problem of a major terrorist attack. 167
The Bush Administration has taken two major steps to fulfill its obliga-
tion to protect the American people from future attacks by international
terrorists. The first is the creation of a new Cabinet-level department
entitled Office of Homeland Security'6" and the second is the passage of
an exhaustive piece of anti-terror legislation known as the USA Patriot
Act.
169
162. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the U.N.'s inability
to reach consensus on a definition of terrorism.
163. SrvEN SLoAN, BEATiNG INTERNATIONAL TERRoRisM 43 (1986).
164. For a discussion regarding debate on two such bills, see TOiMAS M. FRlANcK &
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 198-207
(1993).
165. Counterterrorism refers to all those steps taken by authorities in response to a
terrorist attack, e.g., mobilization of medical providers, rescue cre% dispatched to the
scene, activation of the National Guard, etc.
166. The central Clinton era legislation was the 1996 "Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act," commonly called the NLD Act after the sponsors. See Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, National Authorization Act for FY 1997, Title
XIV, Pub. L. No. 104-201 (Sept. 23, 1996). This act appropriated money for 8-12 person
government training teams to conduct emergency training for the firefighters, police, and
medical technicians of major cities in the U.S. See id. Approximately S300,000 was spent
on each city. See id.
167. See eg., Bradley Graham, Anti-Terrorism Plans Termed Inadequate, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 3, 1998, at A9.
168. See 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812-17 (Oct. 10, 2001). On October 8,2001, President Bush
issued Executive Order 13,228 establishing the Office of Homeland Security as an agency
within the Executive Office and named Tom Ridge as the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security. See id. On September 20, 2001, the President's address to a joint
session of Congress stated the mission of the office is to "lead, oversee, and coordinate a
comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism and respond to
any attacks that may come." Bush, supra note 1; see also PRESIDENT GEORGE NV. Busn,
SECURING THE HOMELAND, STRENGTHENING THIE NATION (2001), available at http:/I
www.whitehouse.govlhomelandhomeland securitybook.html.
169. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (Oct. 26,2001) [hereinafter USA Patriot Act]. The bill passed in the Senate by a
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B. Federal Courts and Military Tribunals
In the wake of the military campaign in Afghanistan approximately
five hundred al-Qa'eda and Taliban fighters were captured and turned
over to United States forces for disposition.170 As of May 2002, the
United States transported approximately three hundred to Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, 7' for temporary internment. 72 Two questions immediately
arose in regard to due process173 concerns for these individuals. First,
were they entitled to treatment as prisoners of war under the Geneva
Conventions? 74 Second, if criminal trials were to be pursued by the
United States, should these individuals be tried in a United States federal
district court or by means of a United States military tribunal (or military
commission)? 75
An analysis of the first question regarding the status of al-Qa'eda and
Taliban fighters under international law begins with the fact that the
United States has long incorporated in its laws the international law of
war, both customary and codified.' 76 After some internal debate, the
vote of 98-1. 147 CONG. REc. S11,059-60 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001). The House of Repre-
sentatives passed their version by a vote of 357-66. 147 CONG. REC. H7224 (daily ed. Oct.
24, 2001).
170. See Scott Lindlaw, Bush Stresses Importance of Terror War, ASSOCIATED PRrESS,
Mar. 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 16388775.
171. The U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo, Cuba was established in 1903 following
the U.S. war with Spain in 1898. It is not considered U.S. sovereign territory. The initial
detention facility was named Camp X-Ray. As of early April 2002, 300 detainees from 33
countries were in custody.
172. The vast majority of captured enemy combatants were processed and released in
Afghanistan. Those held by the United States military were deemed to be either too dan-
gerous to parole or suspected of committing war crimes. Apparently those who continue
in custody will be detained until either hostilities cease or until specific charges are levied
for associated war crimes. See The Abrams Report (MSNBC television broadcast, Apr. 4,
2002) (referring to an interview with the author).
173. The term "due process" is most commonly related to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution which applies as a restraint to the States. Section 1 reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The term "due process" also has come to be associated with
American values of fairness and reasonableness in the treatment of others.
174. Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter G.C. Relative to
POWs].
175. The term military tribunal is synonymous with military commissions.
176. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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Bush Administration correctly affirmed the Geneva Conventions of
1949177 did apply to the conflict in Afghanistan and, hence, the Taliban
government. However, President Bush also determined that the captured
al-Qa'eda and Taliban fighters were not eligible for prisoner of war
status.78
Since the al-Qa'eda fighters belong to a terrorist organization" 9 and
are not recognized members of an armed force,'" they are unlawful bel-
ligerents under the law of war.1 81 This means they are responsible for
breaches of the law of war but are not entitled to the status of prisoners
of war."e2 In the view of the Bush Administration, the al-Qa'eda engaged
in acts of war both in the September 11, 2001, attack and in fighting
177. The 1949 Geneva Conventions cover four categories: (1) Geneva Convention of
August 12,1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva Conven-
tion of August 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S. 135; and (4) Geneva Conven-
tion of August 12, 1949 Relative to the Protections of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
178. Jess Bravin, Bush Says No Taliban, Al Qaeda Fighters Are POll's Under Geneva
Conventions, WALL STREET J., Feb. 8, 2002, at A20 [hereinafter Bush Says No].
179. See ITERNATIONAL LAW CoMMrr'EE REPORT TO ABA, infra note 234, at 7-8.
"The law of war applies to non-state [sic] actors, such as insurgents. Given the degree of
violence in these attacks [September 11, 2001] and the nature and scope of the organiza-
tion necessary to carry them out, it is much more difficult to argue that they are not acts of
war than to argue that they are." Id.
180. The U.S. is not a signatory to Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
Aug. 12, 1946, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977,1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol f]. Protocol I seeks to extend coverage
to non-international conflicts in which "peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-deter-
mination." Id.; see Abraham Sofaer, The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 82 ANI. J. INT'L L 784,785 (1988).
181. FM 27-10, infra note 184. FM 27-10, paragraph 60(b) indicates that "[p]ersons
who are not members of the armed forces as defined in [the Geneva Conventions], who
bear arms or engage in other conduct hostile to the enemy thereby deprive themselves of
many of the privileges attaching to the members of the civilian population." Id. Neverthe-
less, it can be argued that the al-Qa'eda should be given POW status as they qualify under
Article 4(1) of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Article 4(1) defines prisoners of war as: "Members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces." G.C. Relative to POWs, supra note 174.
182. See G.C. Relative to POWs, supra note 174. The President's determination
would apply to al-Qa'eda members who were actually engaged in combat. The matter is
less clear for those members of al-Qa'eda who did not actively participate in the conflict as
to whether they would be considered illegal belligerents.
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alongside the Taliban forces in the internationally recognized armed con-
flict in Afghanistan.' 83
As to the captured Taliban fighters, the United States determined they
were likewise not entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva
Conventions because of their failure to comply with the Conventions' cri-
teria which require lawful combatants to wear distinctive military insig-
nia, i.e., uniforms which would make them distinguishable from the
civilian population at a distance. 184 In finding the Taliban "have not ef-
fectively distinguished themselves from the civilian population,"'8 3 the
United States also added that the Taliban fighters had further forfeited
any special status because they had "adopted and provided support to the
unlawful terrorist objectives of the al Qaeda."I 6 While the later finding
would not necessarily indicate the Taliban fighters would not be entitled
to prisoner of war status, the former finding would. 87 Still, the Bush
Administration has repeatedly indicated all detainees were to be treated
in accordance with humanitarian concerns' set out in the Geneva Con-
ventions even though they were not entitled to the protections the Ge-
neva Conventions give to prisoners of war.'8 9
183. It can be argued that the al-Qa'eda have been engaged in acts of war against the
U.S. government since 1996. The al-Qa'eda have been linked to the 1996 bombing of the
U.S. military barracks at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings
in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 suicide boat attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.
184. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, U.S. ARMY FiED MANUAL 27-10, para. 504(g)
(July 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10]. FM 27-10 is considered as the embodiment of the U.S.
Army's interpretation of the law of war in the field. FM 27-10 lists as a war crime (in
addition to the "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions) the "[u]se of civilian clothing
by troops to conceal their military character during hostilities." Id.; see Bush Says No,
supra note 178.
185. Bush Says No, supra note 178.
186. Id.
187. But see G.C. Relative to POWs, supra note 174, at art. 5. What constitutes a
"uniform" is subject to debate. Furthermore, the determination as to status should be
made by a separate military board, not the President of the U.S. The applicable provision
reads: "Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy... shall enjoy the protections of the present
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal,"
Id.
188. But see Susan Sachs, Group Reports Mistreatment of Detainees, USA TODAY,
Mar. 15, 2002, at All. Amnesty International issued a report alleging that the U.S. had
violated detainees' right to humane treatment. See id. The report cites no access to law-
yers, no right to challenge the lawfulness of detention, lack of a presumption of innocence,
solitary confinement, heavy shackling, and lack of exercise. See AMNEsTY INTERNA.
TIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONcERNs REGARDING POST SEICI1:MER 11 DETEN.
TIONS IN THE USA (2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/lndex/
AMR510442002?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\USA.
189. Sachs, supra note 188; see, e.g., G.C. Relative to POWs, supra note 174, at arts.
13, 22. The Bush Administration has repeatedly stressed that all of the detainees were
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Second, if the al-Qa'eda and Taliban detainees are not prisoners of war
and it is determined that there is sufficient evidence to believe a particu-
lar individual has committed war crimes, 190 what is the appropriate forum
for prosecution? Ostensibly, the United States has four options which it
may pursue - turn the accused over to an appropriate foreign jurisdiction,
e.g., the new government in Afghanistan; turn the accused over to an
International Tribunal; try the accused in a United States federal district
court; or try the accused in a United States military tribunal. If one is
only concerned with expediency, the first option is probably the most at-
tractive and need not be discussed here. Likewise, the use of an Interna-
tional Tribunal is attractive but probably not workable due to concerns
over such issues as the absence of a death penalty, possible security com-
promises of sources and techniques, and reduced levels of due process
provided to the accused.191
As to prosecuting these individuals in a federal district court of the
United States, it is well settled that said courts have the legal authority
under both domestic and international law to prosecute nonresident
aliens for terrorist crimes committed on foreign soil as well as for war
crimes.2 A widely cited precedent, which amplifies just how far the ju-
risdictional reach extends in this regard, is the case of United States v.
treated in accordance with the humanitarian mandates of international law and the Geneva
Conventions requirement that all "prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated."
G.C. Relative to POWs, supra note 174, at art. 13. POWs shall be afforded "every guaran-
tee of hygiene and healthfulness." Id. at art. 22. Numerous international humanitarian
groups have been allowed to visit the detainees to include the International Committee of
the Red Cross.
190. See FM 27-10, supra note 184. FM 27-10, article 498 indicates that "[a]ny person,
whether a member of the armed forces or a civilian, who commits an act which constitutes
a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment. Such
offenses in connection with war comprise: a. Crimes against peace. b. Crimes against hu-
manity c. War crimes." Id. at art. 498. FM 27-10, article 499 defines war crimes as "the
technical expression for a violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military or
civilian. Every violation of the law of war is a war crime." Id. at art. 499. The U.S. policy
is that U.S. soldiers accused of violations of the law of war will be prosecuted under the
provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for the substantive offense. A
deliberate attack on noncombatant civilians clearly violates the law of war and customary
law of war. Indeed, the law of war was designed to protect innocent civilians. See, e.g.,
Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 Relative to the Protections of Civilian Persons in
Tune of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
191. For example, speaking strictly in terms of American due process, the accused war
criminal Slobodan Milosevic is being tried in the U.N.-generated international war crimes
tribunal in the Hague for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Under the
tribunal rules, Milosevic can be convicted on any single charge by only a simple majority of
the panel of judges. By contrast, a U.S. military tribunal would require at least a two-thirds
vote for guilt.
192. INTERNATIONAL LAv COMMITrES REPORT TO ABA, infra note 234.
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Yunis.19 3 The Yunis case involved the criminal trial of an Arab terrorist
by the name of Fawaz Yunis who participated in the hijacking of a Royal
Jordanian Airlines airplane at Beirut International Airport in June
1985.'9' The only connection the hijacking had with the United States
was the fact the plane contained some American citizens on board. 195
After reviewing the pertinent international agreements relating to hos-
tage taking' 96 and hijacking,197 the federal district court denied a defense
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and Yunis was convicted of con-
spiracy, hostage taking, and air piracy.198
On appeal of his conviction, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
said the following about the concept of customary international law as it
applied to certain criminal acts: "Nor is jurisdiction precluded by norms
of customary international law. The district court [correctly] concluded
that two jurisdictional theories of international law, the "universal princi-
ple"'199 and the "passive personal principle," 2" supported assertion of
United States jurisdiction to prosecute Yunis on hijacking and hostage-
taking charges." ''
In summary, then, United States federal district courts have jurisdiction
to try individuals for terrorist-related offenses under a variety of stat-
utes,202 and, in at least one case involving a foreign national who tried to
commit an in-flight bombing of an American Airlines flight from Paris to
193. 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
194. See id.; Ihsan A. Hijazi, Beirut Highjackers Free Travelers, Blow Up Jet, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 1985, at A8.
195. Id.
196. See supra note 160.
197. Id.
198. Fawaz Yunis received concurrent sentences of five years for conspiracy, thirty
years for hostage taking, and twenty years for air piracy. His conviction and the D.C.
court's jurisdiction was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See United
States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
199. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FORIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 404, 423 (1987). The "universal principle" of jurisdiction allows States to prose-
cute those "offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such
as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps
certain acts of terrorism." Id. § 404.
200. See United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1137 (1985). Under the "passive personal principle," a State may prosecute non-nationals
for crimes committed against its nationals outside of its territory.
201. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1089-90.
202. United States citizen John Walker Lindh of California, the so-called American
Taliban, is being tried by a federal district court in Virginia for crimes associated with his
involvement with the al-Qa'eda terror organization. See Jess Bravin & Greg Jaffe, Ameri-
can Prisoner in Cuba to Be Moved to U.S., WALL STREET J., Apr. 5, 2002, at A4. As of
May 2002, another U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan, Yasser Esam Humdi, is being held
by U.S. military authorities in the U.S., although the U.S. Department of Justice has not
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Miami on December 22, 2001,203 that power is being exercised., 4 How-
ever, instead of charging suspected al-Qa'eda war criminals with viola-
tions of the law of war, the federal courts would simply apply parallel
statutes related to the mnalum en se crime,205 or apply the appropriate
"terrorist statute."
The final forum, which is available to prosecute those individuals taken
from Afghanistan who are suspected of committing war crimes, is the mil-
itary tribunal. On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed an execu-
tive (military) order which authorized the creation of military tribunals to
try certain "non-citizens" for engaging in terrorist acts against the United
States or aiding or abetting in terrorist acts against the United States.3°
Because military tribunals have not been used since the end of World
War II, the efficacy of using this forum to prosecute the al-Qa'eda and
Taliban fighters for war crimes mandates analysis from both legal and
historical perspectives.
Military tribunals are non-Article III courts.2 7 They derive their basic
grant of authority from Articles I and II of the United States Constitu-
tion. Respectively, Congress has the power to "define and punish...
offenses against the Law of Nations,"2 and the President is the "Coin-
brought charges against him. See generally id. Neither are subject to prosecution by a
military commission due to their U.S. citizenship. See id.
203. Alan Cowell, A Nation Challenged: Shoe Bomb Suspect; Reports Narrow Down
Movement of Man ivith Plastic Explosive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,2001, at B5.
204. See Michael Elliott, The Shoe Bomber's World, Tumm, Feb. 25, 2002, at 46. Rich-
ard Reid, a.k.a. Abdel Rahim, is a British citizen with direct ties to the al-Qa'eda network.
See id. He attempted to explode bombs hidden in his shoes while the aircraft was in flight
over the Atlantic Ocean. See id. Each shoe contained about four ounces of an explosive
named pentaerythritoltetranitrate. See id. The crew and passengers subdued him. See id.
On January 16,2002, Mr. Reid was indicted by a federal grand jury on nine counts, includ-
ig the use of a weapon of mass destruction and attempted murder. See id.
205. The U.S. has apparently determined that those terrorists associated with the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, attack that are captured in the U.S. will be tried in federal district courts.
See Kevin Johnson & Richard Willing, Array of Unknowns Still Troubling, USA ToDAY,
Mar. 8, 2002, at A4. Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged "twentieth" hijacker of September
11, 2001, is being tried in a federal district court in Alexandria, Virginia, on a siX-count
indictment.
206. See Military Order of Nov. 13,2001. The President specifically relied on his con-
stitutional authority as the Commander in Chief, the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Joint Resolution, and 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 836. The Presidential order applied both to
those who were implicated in the September 11, 2001, attack and to individuals complicit in
"acts of international terrorism." The issue of whether individuals not directly associated
with violations of the law of war could be tried via a military tribunal is unsettled.
207. U.S. CON sT. art. III.
208. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8. The term Law of Nations is equivalent to international
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mander in Chief of the Army and Navy., 2°9 Furthermore, Congress has
specifically provided for the use of military commissions in Article 21 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 2 1 1
Historically, military commissions have been used in a variety of situa-
tions associated with urgent government needs related to war. In Madsen
v. Kinsella, the Supreme Court spoke at some length on the history of
military tribunals, saying: "Since our nation's earliest days, such commis-
sions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many
urgent governmental responsibilities relating to war."2 '' In addition, the
Courts have recognized the fact that military tribunals have been used
without Congress specifically "declaring war."21 For example, military
tribunals were used in the War with Mexico,2 13 even though Congress
never formally declared war. 14
A military tribunal consists of a panel of officers who are authorized to
render a verdict and sentence. The historical concern in this instance is
not whether military tribunals can be used to prosecute United States
citizens who may or may not be belligerents, but whether tribunals are
constitutionally able to prosecute non-citizen belligerents for offenses in
violation of the law of war. Regarding the use of military tribunals to try
United States citizens who are not belligerents, the Supreme Court ren-
dered its opinion in the post American Civil War case of Ex Parte Milli-
gan,21 5 where it held that as long as the civilian courts were operating,216
209. U.S. CON T. art. II, § 2.
210. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) section
821 states, "The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do
not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may
be tried by military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal." Id.
211. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346 (1952). "They [military tribunals] have
been called our common-law war courts." Id.
212. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28 (1801). Chief Justice John Marshall recognized
the use of military force in "partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as they
apply to our situation, must be noticed." Id.
213. The Mexican War lasted from 1846-1848. The War broke out when Texas, an
American settled province of Mexico that had broken away in 1836, was annexed as a State
by the U.S. in 1845.
214. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 365 (1862). Congress passed the Act of Congress of May 13,
1846, which did not declare war, but recognized "a state of war as existing by the act of the
Republic of Mexico." See also Spence J. Crona & Niel A. Richardson, Justice for War
Criminals of Invisible Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA.
CrrY U. L. REv. 349 (1996).
215. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866). In December 1866, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a
writ of habeas corpus to a civilian non-combatant named Lambdin P. Milligan, a pro-Con-
federate Indiana resident who was convicted in October 1864 by a military tribunal con-
vened in Indianapolis, Indiana. See id. Milligan was convicted of treason and sentenced to
be hanged. See id. The lower federal court had denied his petition for habeas corpus. See
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the use of military tribunals to try United States citizens who were not
actual belligerents was unconstitutional.217 As to the use of military
tribunals to prosecute non-citizen belligerents for offenses in violation of
the law of war, the standard is set out in the World War II era case of Er
Parte Quirin.218
In Ex Parte Quirin,2 19 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
convictions of eight German saboteurs who had been captured in the
United States and tried by a military tribunal ordered by President Frank-
lin Roosevelt.22 The Court upheld the jurisdiction of the military tribu-
nal, stating: "By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress
has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that mili-
tary tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against
the law of war in appropriate cases."'" The Court easily distinguished
the case from Ex Parte Milligan,-' holding that offenses against the law
of war by non-citizen belligerents were constitutionally authorized to be
tried by military commission3 Besides the trials of the German sabo-
teurs during World War II, subsequent military tribunals were used to
prosecute approximately 2,600 members of the Axis for violations of the
id. In granting the writ, the Supreme Court held that although the American Civil War was
still in progress at the time of the trial, the circumstances in Indiana, a union State, did not
justify the use of a military tribunal to prosecute a U.S. citizen because the civil courts were
open and free to function. See id.
216. The case occurred against the backdrop of the American Civil War, which lasted
from April 1861-April 1865.
217. But see Ex Parte Mudd, 17 F. Cas. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1868) (No. 9,899). In September
1868, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied a writ of habeas
corpus for Dr. Samuel Mudd, a civilian citizen of Maryland, a union State, who had been
convicted by a military tribunal for his part in the Lincoln assassination of April 14, 1865.
See id. On June 30, 1865, the military tribunal convicted Dr. Mudd and sentenced him to
life in prison. See id. Dr. Mudd was transferred to a prison in Florida where he filed the
writ of habeas corpus relying on Ex Parte Milligan. See id. In denying the petition, Judge
Thomas J. Boynton distinguished the murder of Lincoln as a military crime, even though
the War had ended prior to the assassination of Lincoln. See id. The appeal of this deci-
sion reached the U.S. Supreme Court in February 1869, but was dismissed by Chief Justice
Chase as moot due to the fact that President Johnson had pardoned Dr. Mudd and the two
other remaining civilians so affected.
218. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
219. Id.
220. President Roosevelt issued Proclamation 2561 and a Military Order (executive
order) appointing a military commission after the capture of the German saboteurs. 7 Fed.
Reg. 5101, 5103 (July 7, 1942).
221. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28. Congress incorporated the Articles of War into the
UCMJ in 1950. Article 15 is now contained in substantial part at Article 21, UCMJ. There
has been no use of Article 21 to date regarding military tribunals.
222. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
223. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46.
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law of war, 2 4 to include the murder of captured American soldiers at the
Battle of the Bulge.2  The surviving high-ranking war criminals in the
German military and government were tried by a special international
tribunal in Nuremberg, Germany, at the Nuremberg Trials, 22 6 and the
Japanese leaders were tried at the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East. 2 7
Although the Supreme Court has long held the Constitution's Fifth22 8
and Sixth Amendment 229 protections apply to non-United States citi-
zens, 230 such protections do not extend to individuals subjected to trial in
military tribunals for war crimes. Seemingly, the use of military tribunals
has deeply seated historical and legal precedent as long as the non-citizen
combatants are charged with violations of the law of war. In Application
of Yamashita,"s3 the Court traced the history of military tribunals and
concluded: "By thus recognizing military commissions in order to pre-
serve their traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants... Congress
224. For an excellent historical development, see H.W. ELLIOTr, Tim, TRIAL AND
PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS IN THE "NEw WORLD ORDER" (unpublished Doctor of
Juridical Science Thesis 1996, rare book room U. of Va. School of Law) [hereinafter ELLI.
oTr S.J.D. THESIS].
225. See Jan E. Aldykiewicz, Authority to Court Martial Non-US Military Personnel
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed During Internal
Armed Conflicts, 167 MIL. L. REv. 74 (2001).
226. The international tribunal was created, and the crimes within its jurisdiction
spelled out, in the London Charter of Aug. 8, 1945. The tribunal consisted of representa-
tives from the major allied powers-the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and France. The
accused were charged with a combination of offenses labeled: crimes against humanity,
crimes against peace ("the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggres-
sion.. ."), and war crimes. The tribunal lasted from Nov. 20, 1945-Oct. 1, 1946. Twelve of
the twenty-two defendants were convicted and sentenced to death, seven were convicted
and sentenced to terms in prison ranging from ten years to life, and three were acquitted.
For a critique of some aspects of the Nuremberg Trials regarding standards of proof, rules
of evidence, etc., see, H. K. THOMPSON, JR., & HENRY STRurz, DOENITZ Ar NUREM1ERO:
A REPRISAL (1976).
227. See ELLIOT SJ.D. THESIS, supra note 224.
228. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
229. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
230. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). The case regards aliens
present in the U.S. and charged with criminal offenses. See id.
231. Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita was tried before a U.S. military commis-
sion for his failure to exercise command over 20,000 Japanese sailors who engaged in a
rape and murder rampage in Manila in the closing days of World War II. See LAWRENCE
TAYLOR, A TRIAL OF GENERALS 165-67 (1981); Jeffrey F. Addicott & William A. Hudson,
Jr., The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 MIL. L.
REv. 153, 169 n.66 (1993). The court did not prove that Yamashita ordered the war crimes,
but convicted him under a "should have known standard." See Addicott & Hudson, Jr.,
supra, at 169 n.66.
[Vol. 4:209
THE WAR ON TERROR
gave sanction, as we held in Ex Parte Quirin, to any use of military com-
missions contemplated by the common law of war." 232
While various issues remain to be worked out,2a3 challenging the con-
stitutionality of military tribunals to try the al-Qa'eda terrorists for war
crimes will prove a difficult task. In its January 2002 report on the lawful-
ness of using military tribunals, the American Bar Association (ABA)
Task Force on Terrorism and Law found the terror attacks of September
11, 2001, were arguably violations of the law of war that would justify the
use of military tribunals to prosecute accused terrorists3 a Similarly, in
February 2002, the ABA House of Delegates supported the President's
proposed use of military tribunals, but recommended the implementing
regulations afforded to "an accused in any military tribunal be raised to
the level that would satisfy the requirements of fundamental faimess."' ' -5
A more fertile area for discussion is associated with the rules and pro-
cedures by which the military tribunals will operate. 36 After months of
speculation, 7 on March 21, 2002, the Secretary of Defense promulgated
Military Commission Order No. 1, entitled: Procedures for Trials by Mili-
tary Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War on
232. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
233. See Paul Leavitt, Judge Rejects Lawsuit Regarding Detainees, USA TODAY, Feb.
22, 2002, at 4A. A federal district court Judge dismissed a lawsuit filed by "civil rights"
advocates to force the U.S. to bring the detainees into a federal district court for trial. See
id. The Court held that the U.S. Naval Station in Cuba is not U.S. territory. See id.
234. See Anne Gearan, ABA Panel Supports Limited Military Trials, WASH. POsT, Jan.
8, 2002, at A4. See the ABA website for a posting of the full report at AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATiON TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, REPORT AND RECOMM.ENDA-
TIONS ON MILrrARY COMMISSIONS (Jan. 4,2002), at http'l/www.abanet.org/leadershipimili-
tary.pdf (last modified Jan. 4, 2002) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAv CoimrrrEE
REPORT TO ABA].
235. AmmcAN BAR AssOCtATION OF THE DisTmicr OF COLUMBIA, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2002), at http://www.abanet.orgleadership2002/8c.pdf (last modi-
fied Feb. 2002). In the summary.
The recommendation proposes that military commissions ... be structured and imple-
mented.. . having procedures that conform to those established for general courts-
martial conducted pursuant to the UCMJ, and being made subject to judicial review in
an appropriate federal court. The Recommendation takes no position on any issue
other than those stated, and assumes that the President has inherent authority to au-
thorize military commissions.
Id.
236. See Evan J. Wallach, The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World
War II War Crimes Trials: Did They Provide an Outline for International Legal Procedure?,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 851 (1999) (discussing the standards promulgated by the
office of the President).
237. See Toni Locy & Richard Willing, Proposal Mould Widen Defendants' Rights,
USA TODAY, Dec. 31,2001, at 9A.
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Terrorism."~ As expected, the rules and procedures generally contain
many of the same provisions found in the Manual for Courts-Martial,
239
which applies to United States military personnel when tried under the
UCMJ.2 4 ° Specifically, the rules provide the following rights for the 'ac-
cused who is charged with a violation of the law of war:241
* a copy of the charges in English and a language he understands;
* a presumption of innocence for the accused;
* guilt must be proved by the government beyond a reasonable
doubt;
* access to evidence that the prosecution plans to present at trial;
• access to evidence known to the prosecution tending to exculpate
the accused;
" right to remain silent;
* right to testify subject to cross-examination;
* right to obtain witnesses and documents for defense;
" right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses,
* the appointment of interpreters to assist defense;
" right to be present at every stage of trial (except when proceed-
ings are closed by the Presiding Officer) unless disruptive;
* access to sentencing evidence;
" cannot be tried again by military commission once verdict is final;
" right to submit a plea agreement;
* two-thirds of the military officers on the panel must agree on
findings of guilt;
* unanimous decision of a seven member panel for death sentence;
* right to a free military attorney or to hire a civilian attorney; and
* trial would be open to public (exceptions recognized for physical
safety of participants, protection of classified information, etc.).
The military commission itself will be appointed by the Secretary of
Defense or his designee and will contain a panel of three to seven mem-
bers, all of who are commissioned officers in the United States military.
A presiding officer (PO) will be appointed to preside over the proceed-
ings. The PO will be a judge advocate (military attorney) and will also
.serve as a voting member of the panel. The prosecutor will be a judge
advocate although the Attorney General may provide special trial coun-
sel to assist. The military commission is authorized to summon witnesses,
238. Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, March 21, 2002 [here-
inafter MCO #1].
239. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (MCM), U.S. (1988).
240. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq/. (2000).
241. See MCO #1, supra note 238, [[ 4-6.
[Vol. 4:209
THE WAR ON TERROR
administer oaths, require document production, and to designate special
commissioners to take evidence.242
Two areas of remaining tension associated with the use of military com-
missions concern the matters of post-trial review and admissible evi-
dence 2 43 For post-trial review, the rules state that the record of trial will
be transmitted to a Review Panel of three officers, one of whom has ex-
perience as a judge (the rules do provide that the Review Panel can con-
tain civilians appointed by the President). The Review Panel will review
the record of trial, and within 30 days, forward the case to the Secretary
of Defense with a recommendation or remand the case for further pro-
ceedings. If the Review Panel sends the record of trial to the Secretary of
Defense, he will then conduct an independent review and either remand
the case for further proceedings or forward it to the President with his
recommendation for a final decision (the rules do provide that the Presi-
dent can grant the Secretary of Defense the authority to approve the
findings and sentence). 2 "
In regards to the issue of admissible evidence at trail, the rules allow
that the military tribunal will operate in the traditional manner of all pre-
vious tribunals and consider hearsay evidence and information gathered
without a search warrant.245 The standard for admissible evidence is that
it would have probative value to a reasonable person2 46 In addition, wit-
nesses may testify by telephone or audiovisual means, evidence from pre-
vious trials may be considered, and the panel may take conclusive notice
of facts not subject to dispute.247
Surely, it is evident that in a democratic society the preferred frame-
work for addressing terrorist crimes in normal situations is the federal
criminal justice system. However, considering the number of possible de-
fendants and the fact that the United States gained custody of these indi-
242. Id. 4.
243. See Jess Bravin, Military-Tribunal Defendants Get Fewer Rights and Procedural
Rules, WALL S=TRr J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A4.
244. See MCO #1, supra note 238, 1 6H.
245. This is not an uncommon matter in criminal cases in civil law countries in Eu-
rope. A panel of professional judges decides all factual and legal issues and may consider
information they consider relevant to the case (e.g., hearsay). Furthermore. in most cir-
cumstances, judges may question the accused. See, eg., MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL.,
Co PARATiVE LEGAL TRADrnoNs (2d ed. 1994).
246. A parallel system operates in the context of administrative hearings. "[R]elevant
evidence not admissible in [criminal] court, including hearsay, is admissible at an adminis-
trative hearing." Tyra v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 896 F.2d 1024, 1030 (6th Cir.
1990). Furthermore, per Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, "[Tjechnical rules for the ex-
clusion of evidence applicable in jury trials do not apply to proceedings before federal
administrative agencies .... ." Opp Cotton Mills v. Adm'r, 312 U.S. 126, 155 (1941).
247. See MCO #1, supra note 238, 6D.
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viduals in the context of armed conflict against this terrorist network and
their State sponsors, the military tribunal model is, for now, appropriate
in the current crisis.
C. Investigating Terrorist Suspects
One of the first issues of concern to draw the attention of the public
following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, was the possibility
that other al-Qa'eda terrorist cells were at-large on American soil 248
Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel were put on the high-
est alert, and an immediate search for suspected terrorists associated with
the attack on America began under the direction of the Department of
Justice.249 Over one thousand illegal aliens were detained for question-
ing, and within four months about two-thirds accepted voluntary depar-
ture orders or were deported.2 0
To better assist law enforcement to prevent future acts of terrorism
against the United States, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act25 1 which
contains a variety of criminal procedure provisions. Because almost all of
the provisions in the USA Patriot Act amend or add language to existing
federal statues, it will be some time before the meaning and impact of
many of the provisions can be fully evaluated in terms of constitutional-
ity. For example, section 203 of the Act amends the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (FRCP)15 2 to allow the sharing of grand jury infor-
mation with other interested agencies if it relates to foreign intelligence,
section 219 amends the FRCP2 5 3 to authorize nationwide search warrants
for terrorism cases, section 213 adds a subsection to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a in
order to authorize a delayed notice of execution of a search warrant
(under specific conditions), etc.
Although an in-depth analysis of the new changes authorized by the
USA Patriot Act is beyond the scope of this monograph, a provision giv-
ing the Attorney General broad powers to take into custody and detain
illegal aliens suspected of terrorism will most likely prove to be the most
248. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson & Toni Locy, Terror-Related Arrests Soar, USA TODAY,
Nov. 1, 2001, at Al. The violation of immigration laws served as the primary authority for
the FBI and immigration officials to detain over 1,000 individuals across the U.S. in the
wake of the terrorist attacks. See id. As of the beginning of May 2002, approximately 300
individuals were still being detained and investigated for possible terrorist connections.
249. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is the lead agency for domestic terrorism.
DOJ uses the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as its primary action organization in
this regard.
250. See, e.g., 326 Still Detained, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Feb. 23, 2002, at A12.
251. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 169.
252. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C).
253. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a).
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controversial and bears analysis here. The power to indefinitely detain
illegal aliens raises, at the very least, a constitutional due process issue
under the Fifth Amendment, a matter which will most certainly require
resolution by the federal judiciary 54
Specifically, section 412(a) of the USA Patriot Act adds section 236a to
the Immigration and Nationality Act,1 5 alloving the Attorney General
to take into custody any alien certified to be inadmissible or deportable
on one of six grounds: (1) espionage, (2) sabotage, (3) export restrictions,
(4) attempt to overthrow the United States Government, (5) terrorist ac-
tivities, and (6) any other "activity that endangers the national security of
the United States. ' 2 6 Section 412(a)(5) then requires the government to
either begin criminal or deportation proceedings within seven days of the
detention." 7 Ostensibly, however, section 412(a)(6) empowers the gov-
ernment to indefinitely detain certain certified alien terrorists who are
not likely to be deported in the foreseeable future due to the continuing
nature of the investigation."' s The question of concern regards the mat-
ter of how long a certified individual terrorist may be detained and under
what conditions?" 9
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutional-
ity of section 412(a)(6). Nevertheless, because of a 2001 decision entitled
Zadvydas v. Davis,'6° it seems likely the Court will probably find that
section 412(a)(6) is constitutional. In Zadvydas the Court was concerned
with the constitutionality of whether the government can detain a remov-
able alien beyond the removable period, i.e., indefinitely, or "only for a
period reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal from the coun-
try.''261 The Court construed the applicable section of the Immigration
and Nationality Act2 62 narrowly, firmly disapproving the indefinite deten-
tion of aliens who were not likely to be deported.2 63 However, the Court
254. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). Protection from detention by the
government rests at the heart of constitutional due process concerns.
255. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2001). The changes are
codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1226a.
256. Id. at (3).
257. Id. at (5)_
258. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. The changes are codi-
fied as 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(6).
259. A collateral question also arises in terms of the Attorney General's power to
determine who qualifies is a terrorist. This question will certainly be argued along the lines
of how much deference is given by the courts to the political branches in matters of na-
tional security. See e.g., Cooler & Gell v. Hartmarz Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990).
260. 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001).
261. Id
262. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
263. Zadvydas, 121 S. CL at 2498.
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in Zadvydas did recognize in the opinion that suspected terrorists could
be held for indefinite periods in preventive detention.26 The Court un-
derstood that removable aliens detained for "terrorism or other special
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of pre-
ventive detention," should not be affected by the general rule disapprov-
ing the indefinite detention of resident aliens not likely to be deported.2 61
Zadvydas seemingly exempted suspected alien terrorists as a "small seg-
ment of particularly dangerous individuals" that the government could
subject to indefinite detention.266
The USA Patriot Act's provisions on indefinite detention for certified
(i.e., terrorists) detainees is likely to pass constitutional muster because it
actually exceeds the Zadvydas standard regarding suspected terrorists
held on an indefinite basis. First, section 412(b) specifically provides judi-
cial review of suspected alien terrorists' detentions via habeas corpus. 2 6 7
Second, the new law proscribes fixed time limits for review of the Attor-
ney General's initial certification. Section 412(a)(6) provides that an
alien whose "removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future,
may be detained for additional periods of up to six months if release
threatens national security or the safety of an individual or the commu-
nity., 268 Furthermore, section 412(a)(7) requires the Attorney General
to review said certification every six months and allows the suspected
alien terrorist to request a reconsideration of the certification every six
months.269 If these provisions are satisfied, the said terrorist suspect may
be held indefinitely. If the Court follows its reasoning in Zadvydas, sec-
tion 412(a)(6) will not be struck down as unconstitutional.
D. Use of the Military in Domestic Law Enforcement
There have been a number of new developments associated with the
War on Terror that impact on the use of the United States military. Rec-
ognizing the need to increase military preparedness to fight the War on
Terror, Congress has increased defense spending by ten percent over last
year to $343 billion dollars.270 More importantly, the Pentagon issued its
long-awaited Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) on October 1,
264. Id. at 2499; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997) (cited with
approval by the Zadvydas Court).
265. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2502.
266. Id. at 2499.
267. 8 U.S.C. § 1226b. Actually, the section limits judicial review to habeas corpus
without providing for a standard of review. See id.
268. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(6).
269. Id. at (7).
270. Adam Uymer, Democrats in Senate Back Down on Missile Shield Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at A3.
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2001.271 The QDR is the official strategic policy of how the United States
armed forces should be utilized. The new QDR eliminates the long-
standing vision of structuring the United States military to fight two si-
multaneous wars2 72 and now envisions a military that is based on a "ca-
pabilities-based model" flexible enough to fight asymmetrically and to
deal with, among other things, international terrorism.273 The Pentagon
has also created a new Combatant Command274 headed by a four-star
.general and responsible for coordinating military support in defending
the territory of the United States.275 But even with these changes, the
United States military has yet to cross the mental bridge from conven-
tional warfare to developing action-oriented tactics and strategies that
combat international terrorism in the homeland.2 76
One of the areas being examined in the context of new missions for the
American military is the question of whether a long-standing law prohib-
iting the use of the active duty military to support domestic law enforce-
ment within the borders of the United States should be revoked or
modified.27 This law is the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act which prohibits
the use of the military to execute the civil laws of the United States "ex-
cept in cases under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitu-
tion or act of Congress."278 The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to a
member of the Reserve component when not on active federal duty, nor
271. For an excellent synopsis of the QDR, see Ann McFeatters, Defense Plan Begins
at Home: Pentagon Drops 2-War Preparation to Focus on Terror, PrrrsnuRGr1 PosT-GA-
zEYIr, Oct. 2, 2001, at A6 [hereinafter QDR].
272. ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., U.S. AiuY WAR COLLEGE, FUTURE WARFARE (1999).
Scales argued early on for the adoption of a new strategic vision based on training a pre-
pared force to handle a variety of contingencies. See id.
273. See QDR, supra note 271; U.S. Dep't of Defense, The Quadrennial Defense Re-
view, May 1997, at http'//w~vw.defenselink.mil/topstory/quad.html.
274. Combatant commands are headed by four-star general officers and are responsi-
ble for coordinating all U.S. military forces within a specific geographic area of the world.
For example, Central Command based in Tampa, Florida, is responsible for the Middle
East, while Southern Command is responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean. The
proposed name for the new command envisioned for the territory of the U.S. is Northern
Command.
275. See Press Release by Federal Document Clearing House, Honorable Ike Skelton
(D-Mo.), Proposal for DoD Homeland Defense Command (Jan. 28, 2002).
276. See AARON BANK, OSS TO GREEN BER-M (1986). This tension in tactics and
strategy regarding how to fight unconventional warfare has always existed between the
regular Army and the U.S. Army Special Forces.
277. Press Release, supra note 275. All recent government commissions on terrorism
have "recommended against using U.S. soldiers as a quasi police force." Id.
278. Posse Comitatus Act, 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2001); 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2001). The Act
came about due to the use of federal troops in the southern States to assist civilian law
enforcement during the Reconstruction period following the American Civil War. It origi-
nally only applied to the U.S. Army.
20021
THE SCHOLAR
to a member of the State National Guard when not in federal service.2 79
The Act also does not apply to the use of United States armed forces who
either arrest or assist in the arrest of international criminals outside of the
territory of the United States.280 A variety of courts have held that mili-
tary support to domestic law enforcement short of actual search, seizure,
arrest, or similar confrontation with civilians does not violate the Act.28'
Specific examples of permitted support to domestic law enforcement in-
clude traffic direction and the provision of information, equipment, andfacilities.' 8
As the new Homeland Combatant Command stands up and Congress
weighs other calls for the increased use of active duty forces in homeland
defense, the issue of the Posse Comitatus Act is sure to be raised again.283
Arguments that the Posse Comitatus Act is a Congressional statute and
can be repealed in toto do not rest well with the long national tradition of
excluding the military from domestic law enforcement. 8 The use of mil-
itary forces in domestic matters should only be used in the unique situa-
tion where there is a complete collapse of law and order. In a letter sent
to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in October of 2001, Senator John Warner
(R-VA) asked if the Posse Comitatus Act should "now be changed to
enable our active-duty military to more fully join other domestic assets in
this war against terrorism?"28 For now, the answer appears to be no.
E. Immigration
Concerns for security measures have caused the United States to revisit
the issue of immigration laws regarding who is allowed into the country
and under what conditions they are allowed to remain. By most mea-
sures, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has done a poor
job in carrying out existing laws.286 According to the latest statistics re-
leased by the INS, over 30 million visas were granted to foreign nationals
279. Thus, the use of State National Guard personnel to conduct security screening at
airports is not a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.
280. United States v Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
281. Paul J. Rice, New Laws and Insight Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act, 138 MIL. L.
REv. 109 (1984).
282. STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: BLENDING LAW EN.
FORCEMENT AND MILITARY STRATEGIES (Carolyn W. Pumphrey ed., 2000), available at
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm.
283. See Terry Badger, War Prompts Debate on Military Law, HOUSTON CIIRON.,
Nov. 11, 2001, at A39.
284. See Thomas Lujan, Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army, PAItAM.
ETERs, Fall 1997, at 90.
285. Id.
286. The INS had a budget of 5.6 billion dollars and a staff of 35,000 for 2001, See
Inept National Security, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2002, at 28.
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in 1998 to enter the United States. The reason for entry into the
United States generally includes reasons related to study, teaching, travel,
or conduct business. Of paramount concern in weighing this figure is the
fact that about 40 percent of the nation's undocumented immigrants have
overstayed their visas and about "90 percent of nondetained individuals
who receive final deportation orders fail to surrender [to the INS]." 2"
This state of affairs prompted one Congressman to label the INS as
"worse than useless. '"289
In the final analysis, whatever new changes Congress may make to ex-
isting laws,29I it is painfully obvious that a far better job has to be done.
This critique extends to screening and background checks of individuals
seeking visas to enter the borders of the United States291 and to tracking
the millions of illegal aliens who have overstayed their visas. Neverthe-
less, concerns must be voiced in the public square that an inordinate
tightening of immigration laws may promote "racial profiling" 29 and/or
encourage an atmosphere of bigotry and fear in the general popula-
tion.293 Changes in the law should not impact negatively on the vast ma-
jority of law-abiding aliens; no American wishes to see a return to the
287. For an excellent overview of the issue, see Sonja Garza, Immigration Clampdown
Expected to Be Far-Reaching, SAN ANTONio ExPREss-NEwS, Sept. 2,2002, at A20. The 40
percent figure quoted in the text equates to anywhere between three to five million people.
288. Suzanne Gamboa, Rules for hnunigration Visas 7Tghtened, SAN Aiero~io Ex.
PRnss-Nnws, Apr. 9, 2002, at 7A; see Garza, supra note 287.
289. Inept National Security, supra note 286. Congressman Darrell Issa from Califor-
nia made the remark at a March 19 House Judiciary Committee hearing on the INS. See
id.
290. Exercising its rulemaking authority, the INS has proposed a new rule to "reduce
from six months to 30 days the amount of time a business traveler or tourist can stay in
America." Gamboa, supra note 288.
291. See Eric Schmitt, Agency Finds Itself Under Siege, With Many Responsibilities
and Critics, USA TODAY, Mar. 15, 2002, All.
292. Laurie Goodstein, American Sikhs Contend They Have Become a Focus of Profit-
ing at Airports, N.Y. TIMsS, Nov. 10, 2001, at B6 [hereinafter Profiling]. Since the attacks
of September 11, 2001, the Department of Transportation (DOT) has issued memoran-
dums to workers in transportation centers that discrimination is prohibited. See id. The
official policy of all federal agencies, to include the DOT, prohibits the use of racial profil-
ing. See id. Nevertheless, there have been numerous complaints of racial or religious pro-
filing filed against airport workers. See id.
293. An example of this hysteria occurred when a Dallas man, bent on revenge for all
Americans after September 11, killed an Indian man, thinking the victim was of Middle
Eastern descent. See Nation in Brief, WAsH. Posr, Apr. 3,2002, at A24. "In a television
interview in February, Stroman admitted to the three shootings [of convenience store
clerks], saying he was so focused on revenge after Sept. 11 that he went after any store
clerk whose heritage appeared to be of the Muslim world." Man Guilty in Clerk Killings,
AP ONLNE, Apr. 3,2002, available at 2002 WL 18179103. Stroman has been convicted of
capital murder in at least one of these shootings. See Nation in Brief, supra.
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poisoned atmosphere that occurred when President Franklin Roosevelt
ordered the internment of American citizens of Japanese descent294 dur-
ing World War II.29s
F. New Information Gathering Technologies
If the ability to engage in preventive measures to defeat terrorism are
to be realized, the government will most certainly seek to employ new
information gathering technologies which will include at the very least
the increased use of video surveillance in public places, image-recognition
modeling to scan faces,296 and eavesdropping on electronic message traf-
fic.2 97 Within days after September 11, 2001, the Attorney General pro-
posed a laundry list of new wiretap and electronic eavesdropping powers
to enable law enforcement officials to "act more quickly in fast-moving
cases [of terrorism]." 2 9 Many of these requests, such as a revision of
wiretapping laws pertaining to cell phones, etc., have already been en-
acted into law;2 99 many more issues are sure to be debated as the balance
between privacy and security is stretched to the limit. While there exists
no specific constitutional right to privacy in public places,3110 some privacy
advocates fear that the next wave of government requests might "short-
circuit constitutional safeguards under the guise of counterterrorism. 30 1
A survey of some of the new proposals for combating terrorism clearly
adds to the discussion of where the line should be drawn between privacy
294. See WILLIAM DUDLEY, JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CAMPS (2002). The
order extended to both foreign Japanese nationals and American cilizens of Japanese
descent.
295. See Profiling, supra note 292. William Harrell, executive director for the
ACLU's Texas chapter compared the "current political climate and hysteria to ... when
Japanese-Americans were interned in camps." Id.
296. This technology will be focused on immigration matters. See Customs Border
Security Act of 2001, H.R. Rep. No. 320, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., available at 2001 WL
1558423.
297. See, e.g., Daniel G. Dupont, Seen Before, Sci. AM., Dec. 1999, at 56.
298. Guy Gugliotta & Jonathan Kim, Push for Increased Surveillance Powers Worries
Some, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at A4.
299. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 169 and accompanying text.
300. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. C. (1977). An exception to
the right of privacy is granted by excluding a defendant from liability when said defendant
observes or photographs an individual who is not in seclusion, but rather has placed him-
self for public gaze. See id. The Supreme Court has recognized a citizen's right to privacy
only within the ambit of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, and child rearing.
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1973).
301. Gugliotta & Kim, supra note 298.
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and security.30 2 Two new ideas currently in the mill involve electronic
profiling and electronic eavesdropping.
Since the War on Terror, the Pentagon has stepped up its tests of vari-
ous image-recognition technology hardwares through the Defense Ad-
vance Research Projects Agency (DARPA)." 3 DARPA is developing
sophisticated technology that is similar to new automatic teller machines,
which can scan a customer's face for positive identification. This technol-
ogy has already been tested in England where over 300 outdoor cameras
were used in the East London Borough of Newham to keep watch on
"pedestrians and passerby, employing a facial-recognition system that can
automatically pick out known criminals and alert local authorities to their
presence."3°  These cameras can compare hundreds of thousands of
faces on file against a particular subject face within seconds.30 5
An even more Orwellian advance is found in the FBI's sophisticated
eavesdropping technology which uses electronic message traffic as a pos-
sible tool to track terrorists. 306 The hardware is called "Carnivore" and is
installed at the Internet service provider such as America Online.30 7
Once installed, Carnivore can capture all messages to and from a given
account, functioning as a type of wiretap that traces all calls and eaves-
drops on all conversations.30"
G. Increased Security Measures in Public Places
The final area of interest has little to do with civil rights although it is
often seen as a severe restriction on the freedom of movement which
Americans have long enjoyed. It has, however, much do to with inconve-
nience and cost to the public. Acting primarily through the rule-making
power delegated to administrative agencies,3°9 such as the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA), the United States is increasing the security of
various public transportation facilities with particular emphasis on air-
ports. Congress has passed a number of new pieces of legislation includ-
302. The U.S. is also preparing for so-called "information warfare," where terrorists
will target the Internet for electroijic destruction. See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Net-
work Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Frame-
work, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 3 (1999).
303. Interview with Pentagon Official (Mar. 1, 2002).
304. Dupont, supra note 297; see Kevin J. Delaney, Tech vs. Terror, WALL STREET J.
EUROPE, Oct. 8,2001, at 8.
305. See Delaney, supra note 304; Dupont, supra note 297.
306. See Marcia Coyle & Bob Van Voris, A New Landscape as U.S. Seeks to Protect
Itself, NAT'L W., Sept. 24, 2002, at A4.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See, eg., CoRNmus M. KERWiN, RuLrtAKING: How Gov-RNmtrr AN-CIEs
WRrrE LAw AND MAKE PoLicY (1999) [hereinafter Rux.MAMNG].
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ing the 2002 Aviation Transportation and Security Act,310 which requires
increased airport screening through the use of advanced detection de-
vices, physical searches, and positive passenger bag match. This new law
will prove a burden to both passengers and to the industry in general. 311
For example, a proposed 12 billion dollar expansion to LAX Interna-
tional Airport in Los Angeles, California, is now on hold until a new bag-
gage-inspection facility312 and screening machines required by the FAA
are built.313
The Office of Homeland Security has also finished work on a new
Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) created by Presidential Di-
rective 3. Utilizing a color-coded warning system, HSAS is an advisory
system for federal, State, and local authorities to improve coordination
and communication among all levels of government and the public.
It appears that increased security at public facilities and other public
places is rapidly becoming a part of the reality of the modern era. It is
perhaps the most obvious signpost that Americans are living in a new
epoch. Paradoxically, it is not only our elected representatives who will
decide how much security Americans will receive; those decisions will be
made in part, and implemented in the main, by administrative agencies -
the so-called headless "fourth branch" of government.
314
V. CONCLUSION
"The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.3 15
George Washington
To some, the War on Terror portends a society in which the rights of
the individual will more and more have to give way in favor of ever in-
creasing security measures designed to vindicate the expanding desire of
protecting the safety of the public from global terrorism. It may be a
correct assessment that the continuing War on Terror places our civil
rights vulnerable to erosion,31 6 but the so-called "slippery slope" argu-
310. Aviation and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71 (Nov. 16, 2001),
311. See, e.g., Memorandum from American Airlines, to Jeffrey F. Addicott (Feb. 7,
2002) (referring to the Aviation Transportation and Security Act with the latest updates
and details available at http://www.aa.com).
312. Dan Cray, The New Airport: Safety Over Speed, TIME, Feb. 11, 2002, at 17.
313. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, At Airports, New Watchdog Is Taking Over, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at A16.
314. See RULEMAKING, supra note 309, at 47. The critique revolves around the fact
that agencies are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. See id.
315. WILLIAM J. FEDERER, AMERICA'S GOD & COUNTRY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUO.
TATIONS 662 (1994); see also KATE LouIsE ROBUTS, NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRACTICAL
QUOTATIONS 438 (1940).
316. See Gonzales, infra note 318 and accompanying text.
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ment which resists all changes in the law must be viewed against the clear
and present threat of al-Qa'eda-styled terrorist organizations and their
possible use of weapons of mass destruction. The all too real specter of
mass casualties, billions of dollars in physical damage, and civil disorder
absolutely demands that the federal government fulfill its primary mis-
sion of ensuring the safety of its citizens and the viability of democratic
institutions.
To date, the American people have overwhelmingly approved of the
overall performance of the government in finding a working balance be-
tween defending their freedoms 317 while protecting their freedoms. 318
Nevertheless, as the federal government makes policy and directs the na-
tion in the War on Terror, it is prudent to recall the caution of George
Washington: "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance." ' 9 Accordingly,
all measures employed to combat terrorism must be within the bounds of
democratic principles and the rule of law, and, more importantly, so-
called extraordinary laws should be proportionate to the terrorist threat
and frequently reviewed, revised, and rescinded if no longer required.
317. See Richard Beneditto & Laurence McQuillan, Bush Rates High in Securi;
Lower in Health Care, USA TODAY, Mar. 29,2002, at 13A. A USA Today, CNN, Gallup
Poll released on March 29, 2002, showed that 86% approved of the way President Bush
was handling "terrorism prevention." See id.
318. But see, &g., Emanuel Gonzales, Forunm Explores Idea of Diminished Civil
Rights, SAN ANTONIo EXPRE-ss-NEwS, Feb. 2, 2002, at 5C At a debate focused on the
legal implications of the War on Terror, an attorney with the San Antonio Chapter of the
American Civil Liberties Union argued that the U.S. government is responding to the War
on Terror in such a manner that "inalienable freedoms are %vithering away." Id.
319. FEDERER, supra note 315; see also Rontrrs, supra note 315.
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